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CONFLICT OF LAWS STRUCTURE AND VISION:
UPDATING A VENERABLE DISCIPLINE
LAURA E. LITTLE*
INTRODUCTION
Conflict of Laws presents opportunities for meaningful reflection
on legal regulation and governmental structure. But that’s just the
beginning. In the course of resolving conflicts issues, legal thinkers
can develop a deep understanding of the nature of law itself. While
traditional conflicts thinking and pedagogy may have at one time
fulfilled this promise, it now fails. As a result, many perceive the
field as arcane, dry, and possibly even irrelevant.1 Conflict of Laws is
none of these things. To begin with, Conflict of Laws doctrines
control some of the most compelling issues of our time: same-sex
marriage,2 internet regulation,3 and mass tort litigation,4 to name just
a few. Equally important, Conflict of Laws presents a vehicle for
studying issues related to globalism, world governance, and the
changing nature of law practice.5 After all, if a legal problem is
answered with clashing regulations from different jurisdictions, this
*
Copyright 2014 by Laura E. Little, Charles Klein Professor of Law and Government, Temple
University’s Beasley School of Law, Associate Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws. I am
grateful for the able research assistance of Katherine Burke, Danielle Pinol, and Bradley Smith. This
piece was presented at a faculty seminar at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, organized by
Professor Elsabe Schoeman. The views represented in this article are solely those of the author and do
not represent the views of the American Law Institute.
1. E.g., Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 66 (2014): “The technical, arcane, legal techniques known in the civil law world
as Private International Law or, in the common-law world as the Conflict of Laws (“Conflicts”) . . . .”
2. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 Yale L.J. 1965 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199, 1212–13 (1998)
(discussing the feasibility of national regulation of cyberspace, conflict of laws, and other “tools
available to resolve multijurisdictional cyberspace conflicts.”); Laura E. Little, Internet Choice of Law
Governance, China Private Int’l Law F. (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045070 (arguing
that internet governance issues require heightened attention and consideration of specialized rules).
4. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 547, 551
(1996) (discussing choice of law concepts in complex litigation).
5. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51
Wayne L. Rev. 1105 (2005).
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is a sign that the problem is important and difficult. The existing texts
in the field, including scholarly articles, casebooks, treatises, and
other monographs, tend to fall short in using Conflict of Laws to
highlight its importance and explore its contemporary contexts. The
discipline needs reinvigorating.
This is a message important to all legal thinkers who might
encounter Conflict of Laws: legislators, judges, legal scholars, law
professors, practitioners, and law students. This essay highlights
some remarkable insights that Conflict of Laws issues provide to this
wide audience. The essay provides raw material for scholars and
practicing lawyers, who stand to benefit from these issues and have
the ability to raise the consciousness of others about their
contemporary importance. Riding on the hope of the next generation,
this essay also focuses on pedagogy with ideas on how to highlight
the issues in courses on Conflict of Laws, International Civil
Litigation, and other procedural courses.6
Why does the study of Conflict of Laws hold such promise in
penetrating the essence of legal regulation and governmental
structure? Choice of law issues present profound clashes among the
rules that regulate human life. To choose which of those rules should
actually exert control, legal thinkers must identify first-order
principles that inform the rules’ content and empower rules to
regulate human affairs. Whether society likes it or not, humans
possess egos and relish power, even if it is only the power to control
self-destiny. Inescapable power struggles and the challenges of
compromise are put in sharp focus when framed in legal rules. One
might imagine that a legal shroud might sober the power struggles,
reducing the emotional distraction and confusion. Whether or not this
calming effect occurs when lawyers and judges resolve Conflict of
Laws questions in legal practice and litigation, the emotional and
6. In this way, this essay expands on and updates valuable literature from the 1990s. In 1996, the
Toledo Law Review ran a symposium on teaching Conflict of Laws. See generally Symposium, Conflict
of Laws, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 577 (1996). Other articles on conflicts pedagogy have sporadically
appeared. See generally William L. Reynolds, Why Teach International Family Law in Conflicts?, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 411 (1995); Gene R. Shreve, 1992 Survey of Books Relating to the Law; VII.
Choices of Law and Remedy: Teaching Conflicts, Improving the Odds, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1672 (1992)
(reviewing DAVID H. VERNON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (1990)).
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psychological underbelly of Conflicts provides an important
opportunity for understanding power struggles. More importantly, for
the purposes here, emotional and psychological angles bring rules
alive and thus provide a key teaching vehicle. By highlighting the
“human side” of Conflicts, the Conflict of Laws scholar, teacher, and
practitioner can provide her audience with an important and
interesting angle.
Simply presenting Conflict of Laws’ jurisprudential questions in
abstract form can overlook this human side of the discipline and fail
to engage the audience. Plain words about the emotional,
contemporary, and practical implications of Conflicts doctrine can
help hook the listener. Yet the profound, abstract questions that
comprise Conflicts of Laws are what the discipline make so
important. The challenge then is to navigate a balance between the
two angles, seeking to capture both the practical and theoretical
richness in the subject matter.
For teaching, most existing casebooks squander the promise of
Conflicts as a tool for broad understanding.7 This loss derives from a
number of different mistakes. Many texts rely heavily on older cases
that fail to captivate the modern imagination. Others miss thematic
threads binding the discipline, either because the texts embrace an
encyclopedic presentation or trace the development of Conflicts
through long lines of cases. Finally, texts lose students’ interest and
understanding when the students perceive the textual discussion as
entangled in a maze of abstract analysis or as pursuing an elusive,
“hide the ball” approach with the material. The plodding,
evolutionary approach of many presentations of Conflict of Laws,
such as when many texts trace a long line of cases, can exacerbate
this perception. The result can be low enrollments and low student
interest. While distressing for the purposes of legal knowledge and
global understanding, this is also problematic for another basic
reason: the subject is on the bar examination in twenty-six states and
7. I note that I have a dog in this hunt: LAURA E. LITTLE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, PROBLEMS,
this essay springs from thoughts I developed during the several years—
steeped in conflicts material—I wrote that book.
AND MATERIALS (2013). Indeed,
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the District of Columbia.8 Most importantly, uninspired pedagogy
makes creative legal advocacy and cutting-edge scholarship less
likely. If future lawyers and academics do not experience the promise
of Conflict of Laws analysis during their formative stages, they are
less likely to push the discipline in new directions that accommodate
changes in the legal, social, and technological landscapes.
Conflict of Laws pedagogy and scholarship benefit from
emphasizing current problems, highlighting themes that integrate the
subject matter (and tether it to current challenges), identifying
specific topics that expose the subject’s relevance, and exploring
lawyering skills easily integrated with Conflicts. The subject
naturally presents opportunities to present cutting-edge issues of
8. Alabama Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/njnjz/al.pdf (last
visited
Oct.
27,
2014);
Arkansas
Subjects
Listed,
U.
WIS.
L.
SCH.,
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/fjywq/ar.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Colorado Subjects Listed,
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/ztq4f/co.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014);
Connecticut Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/zg3m2/ct.pdf (last
visited Oct. 27, 2014); District of Columbia Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH.,
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/d4mmv/dc.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Hawaii Subjects Listed,
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/2fgqx/hi.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Idaho
Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/2zjmz/id.pdf (last visited Oct. 27,
2014); Illinois Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/mm3zm/il.pdf (last
visited
Oct.
27,
2014);
Iowa
Subjects
Listed,
U.
WIS.
L.
SCH.,
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/my2fd/ia.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Kentucky Subjects Listed,
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/zb9nd/ky.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Maine
Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/jg5zg/me.pdf (last visited Oct. 27,
2014); Michigan Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/ynjhm/mi.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Mississippi Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH.,
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/k4mgm/ms.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Missouri Subjects
Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/4ymg4/mo.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014);
Nebraska Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/m2gxy/ne.pdf (last
visited
Oct.
27,
2014);
Nevada
Subjects
Listed,
U.
WIS.
L.
SCH.,
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/zgyzf/nv.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014) New Hampshire Subjects
Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/fdc5n/nh.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014);
New York Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/hndnh/ny.pdf (last
visited
Oct.
27,
2014);
North
Dakota
Subjects
Listed,
U. WIS. L. SCH.,
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/nzbkf/nd.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Oklahoma Subjects Listed,
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/jyxfd/ok.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014);
Pennsylvania Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/fgczm/pa.pdf (last
visited
Oct.
27,
2014);
Rhode
Island
Subjects
Listed,
U. WIS. L. SCH.,
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/2rjzt/ri.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Tennessee Subjects Listed,
U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/hmdyx/tn.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Utah
Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/rdfdb/ut.pdf (last visited Oct. 27,
2014); Virginia Subjects Listed, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/yztgw/va.pdf (last
visited
Oct.
27,
2014);
West
Virginia
Subjects
Listed,
U. WIS. L. SCH.,
https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_679/dqxnz/wv.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
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family law, internet regulation, international regulation, and the like.9
In addition, litigation strategy issues (such as international forum
shopping)10 as well as transaction practice issues (such as private
ordering of affairs and contractual choice of law clauses)11 are
important components of Conflicts thinking. Limitless ways exist for
situating these issues and practical concerns within the deeper,
jurisprudential issues of power that make Conflict of Laws so
important. I present here a handful of particularly compelling
examples, organized around the following three themes:
I. The Nature of Law: What forms does legal analysis take? How
does Conflicts disclose a societal preference for judicial, rather than
legislative power?
II. Federalism: What topics best illustrate the challenges and
advantages of federalism? What does Conflict of Laws reveal about
modes of regulation among the constituent parts of a federalist
system? What lessons, opportunities, and concerns arise from
federalism’s creation of forum choice for litigants?
III. Globalism: How should courts resolve transnational conflict
among laws? What does Conflicts tell us about the diversity in world
litigation systems? What is the relationship between International
Law and Conflict of Laws?
I take up each of these themes in turn.
I. USING CONFLICT OF LAWS TO REVEAL THE NATURE OF THE LAW
The first order of business in invigorating Conflict of Laws is to
harness and expand on the great scholarly literature identifying both
regulatory analysis within Conflicts doctrine as well as the regulatory
effects of various Conflict of Laws approaches. With the help of
Conflicts material—and just a little nudging—one can discover what
9. See generally Kramer, supra note 2.
10. See e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International
and Domestic (Revisited), 37 Tex. Int’l L.J. 559 (2002).
11. See e.g., Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close
of the Twentieth Century, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 571, 589 (1999).
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law seeks to accomplish and can observe some of the intended and
unintended regulatory effects of law. Focusing on the form of
conflicting regulations as well as Conflict of Laws analysis itself,
Conflicts thinkers can also gain powerful insights about the forms
that legal regulation and analysis can take—including both salutary
forms and regrettable ones. This second angle includes a cornucopia
of different analytical forms illustrated in Conflicts problems—as
well as the unique insights into modes of legal reasoning and rhetoric
in the subject’s case law. The forms of analysis reflected in Conflicts
provides an opportunity to ponder the propriety of such matters as (i)
an intuitive approach to law, (ii) the effectiveness of formalism and
the related debate about rules and standards, (iii) the power of
framing—and its embrace in the process of characterization formally
integrated in the Restatements (First) and (Second), and (iv) the
discipline’s propensity for complexity. A final significant topic about
the nature of law arising from Conflicts concerns what one might
describe as a preference for judicial, rather than legislative or
executive power. This is reflected in the sanctity of judgments and
the exalted role of judges in the Anglo-American tradition.
A. Regulatory Goals and Effects
The choice of laws component of the Conflict of Laws discipline
invites legal thinkers to dissect legal principles like no other subject.
Regardless of the particular choice of law approach discussed, the
analysis required uncovers many insights about the regulatory goals
and effects of law. I do not suggest this is a new observation. But the
process of developing a basic understanding of the complex and
usually abstract, principles of choice of law doctrine can easily
distract from the range of regulatory goals and effects depicted in
Conflicts cases. For newcomers to the discipline, the process of
learning the complex and abstract choice of law principles can be so
challenging that they overlook larger lessons from the material. It is
worth a second look to discover what choice of law analysis can
uncover.
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1. Regulatory Goals
Regulatory goals drive much choice of law analysis.
Contemplating Conflict of Laws itself thus presents analysts with an
opportunity to self-consciously identify and consider the policy
preferences imbedded in legal principles. Those grappling with
choice of law need to remind themselves—repeatedly remind
themselves—of these transcendent messages from the choice of law
cases.
For illustrating law’s regulatory goals, the most obvious
methodological examples are Governmental Interest Analysis and the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, both of which explicitly
invite the analyst to identify policy goals behind legal principles in
resolving a law conflict.12 Beyond simply reminding legal thinkers
that laws are generally made for an instrumental reason, this process
of goal identification can disclose repeated regulatory patterns. For
example, from the observation that one purpose of a law is victim
compensation, one might inquire into the prudence of pursuing
restorative justice and of designing law to implement the rightful
position principle.13 Likewise, one might expand the observation that
a law seeks to hold blameworthy wrongdoers responsible for their
actions to include consideration of deterrence policies as well as a
government’s resolve to channel and control retributive instincts.
Those
initially
confronting
Conflicts
thinking
often
unquestioningly accept the default of forum law governing any
dispute before a forum court, viewing the principle as either a
predetermined fact of nature or an irrefutable “rule of the road,”
necessary to keep the gears of a litigation system turning.14 Yet,
questioning why the forum law default rule might exist—or
exploring it in the context of the lex fori choice of law approach—
12. See, e.g., CLYDE SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 65–79, 104–05 (2010)
(discussing policy components of Governmental Interest Analysis and Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws).
13. That is, the principle that the purpose of civil law is often to put the injured party in the position
that she would have been in but for the harm.
14. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A “Restatement” of the “Lex
Loci Approach,” 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340, 348–50 (1965) (explaining that domestic law should govern
unless a forum law is required by some choice of law principle).
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opens questions about where courts derive their authority to apply
any law and whether they may legitimately enforce policy
preferences of a foreign jurisdiction. These issues in turn invite
consideration of a court’s obligation to respect legal products of its
home jurisdiction’s democratic processes.15
Other choice of law approaches bring out important systemic
themes that serve as interesting foils for (what are traditionally
called) “substantive” policy goals. Take, for example, the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and Leflar’s Choice
Influencing Considerations.16 Both approaches make reference to
“predictability of results,” “maintenance of interstate and
international order,” and “simplification of the judicial task.”17 These
factors provide an opportunity to explore the idea of what it means
for a court to “decide specific cases justly.”18 Newcomers to
Conflicts thinking are likely to willingly accept the notion that
procedural and systemic values have an important place in the
resolving parties’ disputes over their personal rights. Further
guidance can come from an existing body of Conflicts writing—
distinguishing between “conflicts justice,”19 and “material” or
“substantive”
justice20—that
explores
the
complicated
15. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 41–45
(5th ed. 2010) (reviewing rationales behind the Lex Fori approach).
16. LAURA E. LITTLE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 379–86 (2013)
(discussing the systemic factors of the Leflar’s approach and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws).
17. SPILLENGER, supra note 12, at 114 (noting that overlap of systemic choice influencing
considerations between Leflar’s approach and Section Six of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws).
18. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 189–194
(1933).
19. Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772, 959–60
(1983). When courts pursue “conflicts justice” they seek to ensure they apply the law from the proper
state, and evaluate systemic values such as the needs of judicial systems, uniformity of results, avoiding
forum shopping, predictability, and the court’s ease of determining the applicable law. See, e.g., id.;
Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and
Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347, 348–50 (1974).
20. Symeon Symeonides, Result-Selectivism in Conflicts Law, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 1 (2009).
“Material justice” and “substantive justice” refer to the results courts seek in wholly domestic cases—
without regard to concern with conflicting jurisdictions or multijurisdictional elements. Id. Gerhard
Kegel explains “substantive law aims at the materially best solution, [conflicts law] aims at the spatially
best solution.” Gerhard Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the
American Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 616 (1979). Some scholars argue that courts have the
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interrelationship among the details of a procedural system and its
ultimate goals. Thus, further reflection reveals that a choice of law
methodology acts as a procedural system that promotes policies
related to the governmental system itself as well as policies that seek
to impact private, out-of-court conduct.
Even the classic territorial approach of the Restatement (First) of
Conflict of Laws sheds unique insights into regulatory goals and their
relationship to parties’ rights.21 The First Restatement approach
focuses more on events than legal policies in resolving choice of law
disputes—thus providing an important lesson about territorialism and
sovereignty. Nonetheless, the First Restatement’s emphasis on events
places the role of law’s policies in perspective.22 Some may cling
readily to the notion of fulfilling a particular law’s “substantive”
purposes, but the First Restatement reveals other matters of justice
and expectation that bear serious attention. For example, picking up
on this wisdom from the First Restatement, Professor Perry Dane
identified a “Norm-Based view of the law:”
Particular legal norms may be promulgated to achieve any
number of goals—such as maximizing utility, wealth, or
fairness; . . . Once promulgated, however, a legal norm becomes
part of a normative system that determines the legal status of
various events and conditions in human life. According to the
Norm-Based view of law, the reason for applying that norm in
any particular case is not so much to achieve the underlying goal
of the norm, but to uphold the normative system itself and the
rights and duties created by that system.23

same duties of fairness and justice when adjudicating multijurisdictional cases justly as they do in
wholly domestic cases—and that resolving disputes in a “manner substantively fair and equitable to
litigants should be an objective of conflicts law as much as internal law.” Symeonides, supra at 20. In
the context of a choice of law determination, “substantive” or “material” justice authorizes a court to
scrutinize the competing laws to evaluate which produces the most just result in the case. Id.
21. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1279, 1281, 1285, 1291
(1989).
22. See, e.g., id. at 1292 (explaining that torts cases were governed by the location where the case’s
issue occurred to determine the governing territorial laws).
23. Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1218 (1987).
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Although the increasing rise of globalism and dominance of
cyberspace casts doubt on the utility of territorialism in solving legal
problems, territorialism continues to exert strong control over legal
analysis. For that reason, legal thinkers continue to benefit from
understanding how the territorial approach’s focus on the
geographical location of events privileges governmental sovereignty
and individual expectations, which formal legal definition creates.
These are important governmental lessons pertinent to developing
greater understanding of federalism and internationalism, discussed
below.
In addition to the policy mechanics of choice of law approaches,
another key topic implicating regulatory goals is party autonomy, a
concept fully exposed by choice of law and choice of forum clauses.
Reflected in questions about waiver, arbitration, and mediation,
private ordering of affairs has taken on considerable importance in
today’s procedural law.24 Party autonomy in the choice of law field is
no exception.25 Appreciation of party autonomy issues requires one
to understand that allowing parties to designate which law governs
their affairs (and the forum for adjudicating their fights) can enable
parties to select their preferred regulatory constraints, thereby
empowering them to circumnavigate precisely those regulatory goals
that were designed to govern them. Conflict of Laws thus provides an
apt medium for appreciating government sovereignty (in the form of
laws implementing public policy goals) as a check on private rights
to designate which norms govern individual behavior. Indeed,
consideration of whether courts should enforce choice of law clauses
24. For examples of the burgeoning literature on private ordering in the context of litigation systems,
see Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723 (2011); Daphna
Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized
Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475 (2013) (focusing on an analysis of public implications of pre-dispute
and post-dispute modifications of procedure in litigation).
25. The Brilmayer, Goldsmith, O’Hara O’Connor casebook, Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials,
is particularly strong on the interdisciplinary presentation of the economics of conflict of laws doctrine.
BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 637–787 (6th ed. 2011). For further
materials on this topic, see, for example, Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90
GEO. L.J. 883 (2002); Erin A. O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws,
90 GEO. L.J. 941 (2002); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of
Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000).
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without restriction squarely presents the question of whether routine,
private regulation might shatter a sovereignty-based system of
regulation.
2. Regulatory Effect
Complementing the wealth of learning available on the role of
regulatory goals in Conflict of Laws are illustrations of laws’
intended and unintended regulatory effects. One might analyze these
effects using Conflict of Laws doctrines in connection with social
science theory, such as behavioral economics.26 Consider two case
studies: the first uses a choice of law approach itself—Lex Fori—as a
starting point for analyzing efficiency; the second—the “race to the
bottom” concept—illustrates the intersection between choice of law
and regulatory incentives among states. Here are some details.
a. Case Study: Lex Fori
Most legal thinkers readily appreciate the upsides and downsides
of Lex Fori. As for the upside, Lex Fori presents a potent,
straightforward default: Forum law should apply when a conflict
exists.27 One can certainly embrace the ease of this methodology.
One can also readily see its problems in promoting forum shopping
and disrespect for sister state sovereignty. But it pays to probe
deeper: Lex Fori presents the opportunity to push beyond the obvious
so as to discover insights beyond surface incentives.
One can start by asking about possible efficiency benefits of the
Lex Fori approach. Starting on a micro level, one might observe that
Lex Fori is surely predictable and uncomplicated for individual
actors in the litigation system. Forum law is undoubtedly the law that
courts and local attorneys know best—the law they can more
26. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Social Science Perspectives on Teaching Conflict of Laws, 27 U.
TOL. L. REV. 619 (1996) (explaining ways to integrate law and economics into Conflict of Laws
teaching). For a particularly useful compilation of articles presenting various law and economics angles
on Conflicts of Laws, see generally ERIN O’HARA O’CONNOR, THE ECONOMICS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
(2007).
27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 425 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
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accurately follow and apply as intended. Moreover, when local law is
accurately applied and knowledgeably explained, useful precedent is
likely created, thereby broadening and clarifying forum law. If
parties know that forum law is most likely to govern transactions,
they benefit from the certainty of that knowledge and are well poised
to achieve efficient transaction results so long they can avoid
inefficient laws by enjoying latitude to choose the forum for any
resulting lawsuit. Finally, the specter of potentially competing laws
in other jurisdictions may foster legal efficiency to the extent that
lawmakers respond to this competition by fine-tuning their
jurisdiction’s regulatory rules.28
Now some of the downsides of Lex Fori: while individual litigants
and single-jurisdiction actors may find that Lex Fori fosters
predictability, multijurisdictional actors will not because the
approach allows different laws to govern, depending on where the
lawsuit is filed. And of course forum shopping occurs as well, since
plaintiffs are likely to file in jurisdictions with the most favorable
governing law as well as reputations for beneficial procedures and
large verdicts. Forum shopping might also lead to short-term
inefficiencies where plaintiff-favorable jurisdictions are unprepared
for disproportionate numbers of filings.29 No matter how one comes
out on the questions of efficiency, the process of evaluating
competing arguments exposes intended and unintended consequences
of legal regulation.

28. See, e.g., Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum
Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2004) (reasoning as
follows: “Predictability about the use of forum law reduces uncertainty for parties structuring
transactions. As long as parties can exit the system, the lex fori approach forces a state to internalize the
external costs of bad laws, promoting competition among jurisdictions to improve substantive law.”).
29. Id. at 1372–73. Ghei and Parisi explain the cascading consequences of this. They suggest that
Lex Fori likely fuels trial lawyers and other interest groups in their quest for plaintiff-friendly laws, and
the law can become even more “skewed in their favor.” Id. They argue the “resulting legislation is
‘made’ law . . . giving rise to a ‘made’ order,” which has a “tendency toward inefficiency” as a result of
the “imperfect information and the influence of interest groups.” Id. at 1373.
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b. Case Study: Race to the Bottom
Race to the bottom analysis also provides an important exercise in
projecting the long-term consequences of a regulatory scheme. One
might start by observing that Conflict of Laws would not exist were it
not for regulatory competition among governmental entities and by
acknowledging that the cumulative effects of this competition can be
both beneficial and detrimental to human governance. Understanding
these effects can assist legal analysts in rating Conflict of Laws
systems, allowing them to judge whether to replace the diverse, state
choice of law approaches with a uniform, national (or federalized)
choice of law approach.30
“Race to the bottom” generally refers to the tendency of interstate
competition to decrease regulation to attract businesses.31 This
deregulation—the argument goes—threatens to reduce social welfare
because states in a race to the bottom system serve their own selfinterest to the detriment of the overall regulatory scheme.32 Each
state’s desire to attract business (and avoid losing economic activity)
provides an incentive for all states to deregulate. This deregulation
can reduce social welfare because it encourages such measures as
30. See Solimine, supra note 26, at 627–28. For an important, early article on using this concept in
Conflict of Laws teaching, see id. at 627.
31. See, e.g., Louis K. Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557–58 (1933). The phrase appears to derive
from a dissent by Justice Brandeis, describing the trend in weaker states to create less restrictive laws to
attract corporations as a “race . . . not of diligence but of laxity.” Id. at 559.
32. Id. at 557–59. The theoretical foundation for the race to the bottom is the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.”
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-theBottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1217 (1992)
(explaining the phenomenon). An example used to explain the Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm involves a
prosecutor who separately interrogates two suspects, trying to get each to confess. Id. If neither suspect
confesses, the prosecutor can obtain only limited success (say, a misdemeanor conviction with a tenmonth sentence). Id. If only one suspect confesses, the prosecutor might offer that suspect a plea deal
with a shorter sentence (say, three months). Id. The prosecutor could then seek a felony conviction for
the non-confessing suspect and might obtain a longer sentence (say, twenty years). Id. If both suspects
confess, they might be both convicted of a felony and receive a shorter, but still significant sentence
(say, five years). Id. The paradigm generally posits that each suspect will confess to the crime because
each suspect mistrusts the other and believes that confessing will be the safest option. Id. at 1218. For
example, if a suspect refuses to confess, there is the chance that the other suspect will confess and leave
the first suspect with the highest sentence of twenty years. Id. Though the outcome of confessing (either
five years if both parties confess or three months if the other suspect does not) is better than the outcome
of being the only party not to confess (twenty-year sentence), the best overall (“Pareto optimal”)
outcome for both suspects is to not confess at all (ten months). Id. In this model, the suspects’ sole focus
on the best personal outcome keeps them from cooperating so as to achieve the best overall outcome. Id.
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permissive environmental laws, allowing increased pollution and
prompting resident health problems.33 Deregulation may benefit a
state with increased revenue from new businesses and industries but
can also harm the state’s residents. The risk is that each state will act
without regard for long term or collateral consequences. Obsessed
with the idea that a failure to deregulate would lead to high costs
(such as economic activity), the state does nothing to discourage
other states from also deregulating themselves. If the states
considered their actions in the aggregate—the argument continues—
they might recognize that the optimum outcome is for all states to
adopt an appropriately stringent standard of regulations.
Scholars have observed a particularly clear race-to-the-bottom
dynamic in the evolution of products liability laws.34 They observe
that states have an interest in adopting pro-plaintiff products liability
laws to protect their resident consumers.35 On the other hand,
however, states also want to attract new businesses and industries,
and businesses prefer reduced liability levels so they need not
increase prices to offset the cost of liability. Accordingly, states have
an incentive to enact pro-defendant laws to attract more businesses.36
Choice of law enters the picture because some choice of law
principles prompt courts to apply pro-defendant laws more often than
others, particularly since choice of law approaches differ in their
degree of preference for a strong forum law default.37 In today’s
mobile world, products do not remain where they are made, but are
instead sold or shipped to many different states. This means that a
consumer injured by a product likely has a choice to bring suit in the
state in which she purchased the product, where the product was
made, or where any of the parties reside. Each of those states could
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1251 n.136.
35. Id.
36. See Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System, 80
GEO. L.J. 617, 629–30 (1992); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of
Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975, 1028–30 (1994) (explaining the
dynamic).
37. See, e.g., Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory: One More Trip to the Choice
of Law Well, 2002 BYU L. REV. 759, 776–84 (2002) (reviewing the contribution of Conflict of Laws
doctrine to fueling a race to the bottom).
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have laws with differing levels of liability for the defendant producer.
Assuming that plaintiffs do not encounter obstacles limiting where
they can sue, they can file in the forum that will most likely apply the
most pro-plaintiff law. The choice of law approach applied by the
various jurisdictions will substantially dictate which of the
jurisdictions is most likely to do so. For example, a state R resident,
who purchases a product made in state P, could bring suit in either R
or P. If state P has a more pro-plaintiff law and a choice of law
approach oriented to applying forum law, a state R resident would
have an incentive to file suit there. That option would allow the state
R resident to take advantage of state P’s pro-plaintiff law without
purchasing the product there and without paying a higher product
price made necessary because of the plaintiff-protecting nature of
state P’s product liability laws.
Cooperation can ensure the greatest outcome for all those subject
to products liability regulation. However, each state might act in a
self-serving manner with nothing binding each of them to act
cooperatively. One possible lesson of this phenomenon is the
advantage of a uniform choice of law approach—via federal directive
or otherwise. Such uniformity might foster more efficient and
effective legal regulation because plaintiffs would have less incentive
to “shop” for the forum that is most likely to apply pro-plaintiff
product liability principles.38
The underlying message of these theories is that difference among
laws—and resulting competition—affects the decision-making and
behavior of market participants—all of whom are potential actors in
litigation and many of whom plan their activities in light of potential
38. See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law
Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 2–16 (1991) (articulating an argument favoring a uniform choice of law code).
Professor Michael Krauss has made a similar argument, advocating for a federal choice of law statute
for products liability suits. Krauss, supra note 37, at 807. Professor Bruce Hay also advocates for a
uniform federal law that controls the laws governing products liability suits. Hay, supra note 36, at 644–
46. Like Krauss, Hay’s approach tends to prevent consumers from avoiding less protective laws of
defendant-friendly states without bearing the cost of the more protective regulation. Id. In contrast to
Krauss, Hay focuses primarily on predictability and planning, arguing that governing law for a products
liability suit should derive only from the state where the product was sold or where the producing
company resides. Id. By limiting the governing law to these two states, Hay reasons, a business can
better predict which laws will apply to disputes and can plan accordingly. Id.
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lawsuits. Where this difference among laws can be eliminated—such
as through a uniform choice of law code—the uniform law can
account for and remediate possible deleterious consequences of
underlying regulatory differences and competition.39
B. Legal Analytic Form
Some of the richest intellectual lessons arising from Conflict of
Laws spring from the discipline’s potential for exposing forms of
legal analysis. Conflicts study can easily seize—and expose—matters
tied to remarkable and sometimes unique qualities of the legal
process, reasoning, and rhetoric. These striking qualities seem to
result from the intractable nature of many Conflict of Law problems:
there is simply no “right” answer to many of the power clashes
presented in Conflict disputes. Some problems—such as the clash
between state and federal law—contain a “tie breaker” that points to
a ready answer, such as the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.40 More commonly, however, conflicting laws come
from sovereigns of equal status. When this occurs, courts must draw
on creativity to designate a rational “winner.” Resulting analysis
takes many forms: searching, clever, disingenuous, and even comical.
These qualities of Conflict of Law opinions are disorienting for
some. Yet all conflicts thinkers—scholars looking for a lens on the
nature of law, practitioners seeking insights, Conflicts professors
looking to enhance depth to their teaching, and others—can benefit
from exploring the varying opinions. By appreciating and embracing
the case law’s quirks, legal thinkers develop a greater understanding
of the legal process, the dynamics of the adversary system, and
39. Gottesman, supra note 38, at 39. Another topic for illustrating game theory topics concerns
private incentives in judgment recognition. Cf. Yaad Rotem, The Problem of Selective or Sporadic
Recognition: A New Economic Rationale for the Law of Foreign Country Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L.
505, 508 (2010) (contrasting the incentives of sovereignties deciding whether to recognize foreign
judgments with “the incentives of individuals to seek or avoid recognition of a particular foreign
judgment”); Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues of the Recognition of
Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 416, 425–28 (1999) (outlining forum shopping incentives
deriving from recognition law). See also Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Adequate Search for
“Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998)
(addressing forum shopping, plaintiff shopping, and lawyer shopping incentives in class actions).
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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generally become more expert in the rhetorical and linguistic devices
useful where human interaction requires lawyers to operate with
subtlety, creativity, and sometimes even stealth or obfuscatory intent.
The notable analytical forms in Conflict of Laws cases are
numerous. Here are four representative topics: intuition, framing
effects, rules or standards choices, and complexity.
1. The Role of Intuition
Conflict of Laws analysis can be rough going. Properly applied,
the discipline’s rules and methodologies require rigorous mental
gymnastics and double-your-trouble research (i.e., for any Conflict of
Laws problem, one should study the scope and purposes behind the
laws of at least two jurisdictions). That parties and judges quite often
try to ignore the Conflicts issues that arise in litigation evidences this
difficulty.41 For these reasons, the temptation to invoke intuition to
resolve Conflicts issues is strong.
Not that this inclination is particularly unusual: intuition plays an
important part of life and decision-making. Intuition also forms a key
component of the formalized rules that govern human affairs (the
law) as well as the common sense necessary to provide competent
legal representation. And sound reasons support this. Much good can
be said for the chance to grasp a result without need for conscious
reasoning. Intuition’s mental approach resembles heuristics, which
are essential for efficiency and speed in negotiating all that life serves
up.42 Also, intuition is often conveyed easily to others, including
41. SPILLENGER, supra note 12, at 109–10.
42. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 185 (2011). Kahneman does not condemn all
intuitive judgments, as he praises intuitions that draw on “skill and expertise” and lead to “rapid and
automatic” judgments. Id. While the work of Kahneman and Amos Tversky on this subject is perhaps
best well known, a rich body of legal scholarly literature also explores the efficacy of intuition. This
literature seeks to understand such questions as whether intuition is “non-rational” or illogical, whether
judicial reasoning masks intuitive judgments, and whether intuition enhances the morality in decision
making. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517,
523–24 (1998) (contrasting the process of reasoning with intuition); Paul Gewirtz, On “I Know It When
I See It,” 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1024–31 (1996) (discussing limits of articulating standards and
expectations about opinions reflecting a “conscious process of deduction”); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr.,
The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278,
285–87 (1929) (exploring the tension between accommodating intuition and the need to make a judicial
opinion appear reasonable); Douglas Lind, Logic, Intuition, and the Positivist Legacy of H.L.A. Hart, 52
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those who are legally trained and those who are not. Finally, intuition
is extremely useful, perhaps essential, to the rule of law. An intuitive
connection between what law is and the reasons behind the law can
make law more effective. If legal rules make good “intuitive sense,”
then they are readily embraced by the governed—that is, citizens
who must live by the rules.
Of course, prudence counsels against overreliance on intuition.
One needs to be wary that intuition does not serve as an unfortunate
“substitute [of] an easy question for [a] harder one.”43 Deep
understanding does not emerge from what Daniel Kahneman might
describe as “System 1” thinking—from which conclusions arise from
automatic, stereotypic, emotional, and sometimes even subconscious
impulses.44 This is especially true for legal understanding. Law is a
rigorous discipline, tied closely to formal logic and rationality. To
competently navigate among legal doctrines and apply them to a
given fact situation, one must sift through many facts and concepts,
integrating relevant factors, checking for irrelevant ones, and the like.
In other words, the competent legal analyst needs to muster plenty of
“System 2” thinking—deliberative, effortful, and calculating
thought.45
In charting the appropriate balance between intuition and
deliberative thought, Conflict of Laws provides a particularly fertile
medium. Why? Well, as suggested above, intuition’s invitation to
avoid the frustration of difficult, sometimes altogether incoherent,
Conflicts doctrine can especially tempt one to ignore the benefits of
formal legal analysis. Nonetheless, some measure of intuition may
help navigate difficult cultural and value clashes that are reflected in
legal differences highlighted by the choice of law processes.46
SMU L. REV. 135, 148–65 (1999) (exploring connections among logic, intuition, and legal formalism);
R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1406–20
(2006) (describing various forms of judicial reasoning and its dependence on intuition).
43. KAHNEMAN, supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 361.
46. See Annalise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 274–75 (2008)
(describing how Conflict of Laws extends beyond analytical puzzles and requires a forum court to
evaluate and understand a foreign value system).
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Intuition might penetrate the effects of complex analysis, which can
conceal power dynamics and subtleties reflected in laws with
conflicting terms.
Two readily available Conflicts approaches useful for comparing
intuition with lock-step legal analysis are the Center of Gravity
approach47 and Governmental Interest Analysis. Under the Center of
Gravity approach, courts generally identify contacts that bear “weight
and significance” in the dispute,48 and apply the law of the
jurisdiction that hosts the nucleus or gravity center of relevant
contacts. Yet courts following the approach do not provide much
guidance about which contacts matter, and which contacts do not, for
the purposes of pinpointing the gravity center.49 By contrast,
Governmental Interest Analysis calls for step-by-step consideration
of laws’ goals, evaluation of contacts relevant to those goals, and
determination of whether the dispute implicates those goals.50 Many
legal thinkers—particularly those new to Conflict of Laws—are
especially drawn to Governmental Interest Analysis—perhaps (I
hypothesize) because its resolution of false conflicts is so
intellectually compelling.51 But once one experiences the tortured
reasoning that has proliferated in the name of Governmental Interest
Analysis, its apparently constrained method starts to lose its shine,
and the benefits of an intuition-driven approach may become more
appealing.

47. See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961). The Center of Gravity approach is
seen as a transition between the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws and more developed modern
approaches. LITTLE, supra note 16, at 292–96. Indeed, New York courts have moved well beyond the
orientation of Haag, but the court’s reliance on intuition in reaching its result is hardly unknown in
contemporary choice of law cases. Id. at 296–97. Consider, for example, the most significant
relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id. at 298.
48. Haag, 175 N.E.2d at 444.
49. See, e.g., LITTLE, supra note 16, at 295–96.
50. Id. at 379. Indeed, one of the first expositions of Governmental Interest Analysis presents the
approach in statute-like formality. See Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1242–43 (1963).
51. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 50 (applying the Governmental Interest Analysis). A false conflict is
one in which only one jurisdiction (out of two or more) has an actual interest in applying its law—even
though laws have nominally conflicting terms. Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693 F. Supp. 442, 468 (E.D. Pa.
2010). If anything comports with common sense, applying the law of the only interested jurisdiction
certainly does.
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2. The Debate About Rules and Standards: Formalism vs.
Functionalism
Another debate about analytical reasoning presented in Conflicts
decisions is the perennial dispute about the suitability of “rules”
versus “standards” as instruments for governance.52 The evaluation
of the relative merits of various choice of law approaches invariably
implicates the question of whether rules or standards govern more
effectively.
Scholars define a “rule” as a “legal directive” requiring a decisionmaker to reach a certain result upon finding the presence of certain
triggering facts.53 Some emphasize that rules “entail an advance
determination of what conduct is permissible.”54 Rules enable
formalistic decision-making, associated with categories defined by
bright-line specifics. The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws is a
rule-based approach.55
By contrast to rules, standards require that the decision-maker
apply a “background principle or policy” to a set of facts before
rendering a binding decision about the facts.56 Standards allow the
decision-maker to decide whether certain conduct should be allowed
after the conduct has occurred and the court has evaluated the
conduct’s effect.57 Standards implement functional decision-making,
often associated with balancing tests, and promote reasoning by
reference to the purposes underlying legal directives.58 Modern
52. See, e.g., Adam I. Muchmore, Jurisdictional Standards (and Rules), 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
171, 175 (2013) (discussing jurisprudential rules and standards).
53. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
58 (1992) (describing a rule as binding “a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the
presence of delimited triggering facts”). See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV.
379, 381 (1985) (conceptualizing legal rules as “a series of directives,” where each directive has “a
‘trigger’ . . . and a ‘response’ that requires or authorizes a legal consequence when that [trigger] is
present”).
54. Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992).
Kaplow’s analysis is cited widely within legal scholarship.
55. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
56. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 58. See also Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 622, 623 (1999) (using the term “nonformalistic law” as synonymous with standards
and defining standards as abstract concepts that “refer to the ultimate policy or goal animating the law”).
57. Rosen, supra note 56, at 623.
58. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 60.
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choice of law methodologies tend to promote standards-based
decision-making, as reflected in the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws, Governmental Interest Analysis, Comparative Impairment,
and the Better Rule of Law approach.59
The rule-based approach to decision-making has been pilloried in
the recent past, but has experienced a resurgence of support.60
Proponents argue that rules reduce complex reasoning and constrain
discretion, thereby promoting uniformity, efficiency, predictability,
and even-handed justice.61 Justice Antonin Scalia often propounds
the virtues of rule-based decision-making, arguing that rules of law
should be pre-announced so as to limit arbitrary authority and to
minimize legal administration costs.62 Not surprisingly, rule-based
decision-making is popular among law and economics thinkers—one
might even argue the rule-like quality of the Restatement (First) of
Conflict of Laws accounts for its popularity among some law and
economics thinkers.63 One scholar has argued that the standard-based
thinking reflected in Governmental Interest Analysis creates high
transaction costs, which leads to “frequent forum preference and thus
globally suboptimal outcomes.”64 Law and economics thinkers,
however, have not reached consensus on the subject, and some
celebrate the benefits of ad hoc adaptation made possible by
standards.65
Although rule-based decision-making has gained in popularity,
many are dubious of its merits, including those working in Conflict
of Laws.66 In particular, courts and scholars observe that its
59. See generally SPILLENGER, supra note 12.
60. E.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 806 (8th ed. 2010) (arguing that the
First Restatement avoids multifactor balancing); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Conflict of Laws
and Choice of Law, in ELGAR’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 637 (Boudewijn Bouckaert
& Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (praising the rule-like quality of the First Restatement, although advising
that it be modified “to avoid frequent arbitrary results”).
64. See Ralf Michaels, Economics of Law as Choice of Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 94
(2008).
65. See id. at 93–94 n.126; Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42
VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 45–46 (2001).
66. See Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of the Stand-
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simplicity is illusory, since the rigidity of rules can spawn exceptions
and complexity.67 The escape valves associated with the First
Restatement provide evidence of this.68 Moreover, once a judge
decides to make an end run around a rule, judicial candor can suffer
and complications multiply.69 Take, for example, a court’s decision
to recharacterize a prenuptial agreement dispute as presenting a
marriage issue, rather than a contract issue. The court making the
recharacterization may be seeking to trigger the place of celebration’s
law so as to avoid an inequity that would arise if it applied the law of
the place of making the contract to the specific case. What does this
mean for the proper characterization for future prenuptial agreements
where the inequity is not an issue? Should the court use a marriage
characterization on the basis of precedent, or should the court
distinguish the precedent and use a contract characterization?
In addition to pointing out deficiencies in rule-based decisionmaking, some proponents of standard-based decision-making
affirmatively celebrate how the ad hoc nature of standards can make
them effective regulatory instruments.70 These thinkers argue that
standards allow courts to do what courts do best: tailor the law to the
specifics of the case to do justice.71 From this point of view, the
flexibility of the methodologies, such as the Second Restatement or
the Better Rule of Law approach, makes it more likely that the
approaches are better able to respond to the challenges of dueling
jurisdictional claims to governing in the ever-changing world.72
Two scholars argue that one component of standards-based
decision-making—balancing—is particularly well suited to choice of
law.73 They maintain that choice of law disputes require
consideration of so many variables that a single “trigger factor”—
Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1131–45 (2010).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Michael Faure, Morag Goodwin & Franziska Weber, The Regulator’s Dilemma: Caught
Between the Need for Flexibility & the Demands of Foreseeability. Reassessing the Lex Certa Principle,
24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 283, 292–93 (2014).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 66, at 1173.
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such as under the First Restatement—is simply not up to the task.74
Balancing, they suggest, allows a court to “tak[e] into account the
number of contacts supporting a particular state’s law” and results in
minimizing the circumstances when laws are applied
extraterritorially.75
I agree that formal rule-based decision-making may not be up for
the challenges served up by Conflicts problems. But the dynamic, in
my view, is complicated. One problem results from how rigidly rulebased approaches invite Conflicts thinkers to create numerous
exceptions and provide incentives to “game” the rules. The result,
ironically, leads to more complexity.76 This leads to yet another
irony, since a decision-maker who wants to make an end-run around
the rules may have an incentive to avoid candor and clarity in
explaining her decision. And that may not be the end of the story:
even in the face of an apparent failure of rule-based decision-making
to reduce complexity, attempts at creating more standard-based,
functional approaches to Conflict of Laws may inspire an evolution
back toward more rule-based formalism. As I have argued elsewhere,
the emotional and cognitive appeal of rules lies in the elusiveness of
their goal, and this allows adjudicators to continue to place faith in
the virtues of a simple, rule-based decision-making system.77 Even if
these virtues are illusory, belief in the power of “impartial” rules may
actually improve decision-making, contributing to a self-fulfilling
prophecy because adjudicators put trust in the ability of rules to
control and simplify their decision-making process.78
While the evolution of Conflict of Laws doctrine over the last fifty
years might provide support for these arguments,79 the debate about
the efficacy of rules versus standards is certainly not complete.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of Formalism, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 963 (2004).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 966–67.
79. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 900, 903 (Ill. 2007). In support of
this, consider the tendency of courts to try to formalize the flexible, standards-based approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id. (explaining the importance of adhering to the
presumptive rule that place-of-injury should provide the governing law in a tort action).
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Whether or not the debate is ever settled in the Conflicts context,
understanding the merits of rules versus standards can assist in
evaluating the overall merits of competing choice of law approaches.
And of course the feedback loop continues: learned wisdom about the
efficacy of various choice of law approaches continues to inform the
debate about rules and standards.
3. Framing Effects and Characterization
I have celebrated the potential for Conflict of Laws to capitalize on
framing effects many times.80 The possibility that a particular
characterization or frame on a particular fact pattern might change
readily seems to me to be an opportunity for creative lawyering and
developing an understanding of the nature of perception and
knowledge. Alas, though, the terms “frame-shifting” or
characterization might evoke not-so-good connotations, with some
arguing that the initial frame or characterization on a particular topic
can disproportionately influence outcome.81 Thus, thoughtmanipulators or “spinners” profit from creating a favorable first
impression to gain support from others, who do not necessarily
understand the full truth of a matter.82
Despite these potential negative attributes, framing remains a core
advocacy skill. The framing process has some unqualified, beneficial
aspects as well: the process is key to understanding the impact of—
and potential validity of—competing perspectives on a particular
problem.83 Effective legal thinkers need to know how to spin—or
recharacterize—a legal issue to understand the nature of the legal
process and to avoid others’ distortions.
80. See, e.g., Little, supra note 76, at 929, 932; Laura E. Little, Characterization and Legal
Discourse, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372 (1996), reprinted in J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 121, 121
(2009) [hereinafter Little, Characterization].
81. E.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 42, at 364. Daniel Kahneman is often associated with pathbreaking work with framing—or as he describes it—the “influences of formulation.” Id. Kahneman also
warns against the “unjustified influences of formulation on beliefs and preferences” on “framing
effects.” Id. As Kahneman says, however, not “all frames are equal,” and “some frames are clearly
better than alternative ways to describe (or to think about) the same thing.” Id. at 371.
82. Little, Characterization, supra note 80, at 121.
83. Id. at 135, 148.
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Yet there is more to gain here than a rhetorical or advocacy skill.
Study of characterization may also encourage legal thinkers to
challenge categories and break out of “cabined” thinking and rigid
taxonomies that are apparently common in legal doctrine. If one
repeatedly sees that the rigid result of legal rules can be avoided by
creative reframing, then she is more likely to develop confidence to
avoid becoming a slave to choices forced on her by opponents or the
popular conceptions. She is then freed to allow her own sense of
justice to control over her legal analysis. Practice in questioning
predetermined frames likewise empowers legal thinkers to reach a
more sophisticated level of understanding, enabling them to deploy
more creativity in solving legal and practical problems.
These, of course, are generic observations about perception,
creativity, and law. What makes Conflict of Laws so interesting,
however, is that characterization is so pervasive within the discipline.
First, at least two choice of law approaches formally require framing
(although they officially call the mental process characterization):
both the Restatement (First) and the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws require the legal analyst to first frame the legal
issue in terms of substance and procedure—and if substantive—then
according to doctrinal category (property, tort, contract, and the
like).84 Even beyond this type of formal invitation to characterize,
conflicts cases seem to create an endless stream of informal
characterizations. Consider, for example, definitional questions about
words incorporated from one part of a statutory scheme to another:
could it be possible that his partner is a “spouse” for the purpose of
the domestic relations law but not the probate code?85 Is charitable
immunity a loss allocating rule or a conduct regulating rule?86 The
type of thinking required to frame these questions is common in all
forms of lawyering, whether it be counseling, brief-writing, arguing,
negotiating, or interacting with the press. Yet, the struggles for a
84. Little, supra note 76, at 932–33.
85. See, e.g., In re Estate of May, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953), in which the court interpreted New
York’s Domestic Relations law for the purpose of answering a probate question.
86. Shultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 685 n.2 (N.Y. 1985) (analyzing whether
New Jersey meant for its charitable immunity law to be loss allocating or conduct regulating).
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reasoned basis for choosing between relevant laws of co-equal
sovereigns provides especially fertile ground for proliferating
different frames and perspectives.87
4. Complexity
Conflict of Laws also presents a valuable opportunity to view the
benefits, detriments, and possible inevitability of complexity that so
often occurs in thoughtful legal regulation. Simplicity in law is a
sound goal: simplicity ensures that law is more accessible to the
governed and is thus more likely to govern effectively. Indeed,
readily understandable legal principles are more likely to appear
coherent and well grounded, and thus are more capable of garnering
respect and emotional attachment than Byzantine rules. One would
expect that such legal principles are more likely to ensure that
citizens actually obey the law. Yet, for Conflict of Laws, simplicity
proves a particularly elusive goal. The discipline is prone to abstract
distinctions, multiple meanings, and filigreed structures of analysis.
Why is this? As with other areas of law such as tax or civil
procedure, legal complexity results at least in part from the desire to
ensure that law is thorough and fair. Several other more disciplinespecific explanations suggest themselves: the multi-jurisdictional
87. See generally O’CONNOR, supra note 26. A particularly striking example of framing with large
consequence concerns marriage. Questions regarding the validity of marriage are treated as choice of
law matters, for which there is a lot of leeway in identifying an acceptable solution in those instances
where one jurisdiction has a different public policy regarding marriage validity than the jurisdiction
where a marriage was celebrated. See generally Grossman, infra note 101, at 435. If, on the other hand,
marriages were regarded as judgments, a jurisdiction seeking to refuse to recognize a marriage would
have much less leeway than they presently do because there is no public policy exception for
recognition of judgments under the Full Faith and Credit principles in the United States. See Fauntleroy
v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908) (refusing to recognize an exception to judgment recognition based
on the recognizing jurisdiction’s view of the illegality of the claim underlying the judgment). The
proposition that a marriage might be treated as a judgment is not preposterous. Cf. Grossman, infra note
101, at 435. After all, marriage often involves an exercise of judicial authority. Cf. United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708 (2013) (questioning how choice-of-law would apply to validity of samesex marriages). In addition, an asymmetry on marriage status exists in U.S. law: although the creation of
marriage is not treated as a judgment, the dissolution of marriage—divorce—is treated as such, thus
triggering plenary full faith and credit protection. For further discussion of the status of judgments in the
U.S. legal system, see infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. Of all the exertions of governmental
power in the United States, judgments are a category that we treat with particular care. Judgments are
subject to full faith and credit’s iron rule: full faith exerts the greatest protective force on judgments.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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context of Conflicts, the common law system and litigation context in
which Conflicts questions arise, reluctance of lawmakers and judges
to candidly discuss their exercises of power, American legal culture’s
preference for detailed explicit rules and specific authority for
proposed action, and the unusual influence of academics in the
development of Conflicts doctrine.88
The complexity of Conflicts may help inspire commentators to
invoke the “dismal swamp” metaphor often used in connection with
the discipline.89 Legal complexity is certainly not a cause for
celebration. Yet, the process of understanding complexity’s causes—
and of acknowledging that some complexity may be an inevitable
consequence of an impulse to be fair and precise—provides valuable
instruction on the nature of law.
C. Preference for Judicial Power: Cult of the Robe
A useful message emerges from comparing the mode and rigor of
regulation within the three different components of Conflict of Laws:
personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments. Two of these
components concern judicial power (personal jurisdiction and
judgments), while the third primarily concerns what is generally
viewed as law-making or legislative power (choice of law). The rules
within those components that concern judicial power have more rigor
and rigidity than the component concerning law-making power. Does
this suggest a preference for judges over legislators?
First, some definitions: by rules with more “rigor and rigidity,” I
refer to a number of things. Initially, I note that the source of the
rules governing personal jurisdiction and judgments is United States
constitutional principles, while the source of the choice of law rules
in the United States is nearly always state common law—or to a
limited extent—state statutory law. The United States Supreme Court
has enunciated loose constitutional restrictions on what state courts
can do in the choice of law arena, but the constitutional restrictions
88. These causes are explored in detail in Little, supra note 76.
89. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Exploring the “Dismal Swamp”: The Revision of Louisiana’s
Conflicts Law on Successions, 47 LA. L. REV. 1029 (1987).
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have a light touch and are rarely mentioned in state choice of law
cases.90 Yet, the Supreme Court has tried again and again in the
personal jurisdiction area to articulate specific rules for state courts
exercising power over out of state defendants.91
Even more remarkable, however, has been the Court’s traditional
treatment of judgments.92 Of all the exertions of governmental power
in the United States, judgments are a category handled with particular
care.93 To begin with, judgments are subject to full faith and credit’s
iron rule: a judgment in one court is entitled to same sanctity and
effect as it would receive in the court that rendered the judgment.94
The Supreme Court has recognized a few exceptions to this principle
over the years—particularly where personal jurisdiction and subject
matter jurisdiction problems infect the judgment.95 But these
exceptions are limited and certainly do not include the type of
indulgence for the honoring court’s public policy that one sees in the
choice of law area.96
90. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (plurality opinion) (requiring only that the
Constitution requires that a “[s]tate must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair.”).
91. See e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315–19 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 722–33 (1877). In case after case leading up to Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), the Court attempted to refine personal jurisdiction contacts analysis. Id.
After Asahi, the Court enjoyed a several-decade hiatus in personal jurisdiction decision-making. Cf.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (deciding personal jurisdiction
limitations post-Asahi). The Court, however, has focused on the issue again and decided a number of
personal jurisdiction cases in recent years. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); J.
McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846 .
92. See, e.g., Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237.
93. Id. at 232 (discussing the grant of judicial power granted by the Constitution).
94. Stewart E. Sterk, Full Faith and Credit, More or Less, to Judgments: Doubts About Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 69 GEO. L.J. 1329, 1332 (1980).
95. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998).
96. See id. at 233 (stating that there is no “public policy exception” for judgments); Fauntleroy, 210
U.S. at 237–38 (refusing to recognize an exception to judgment recognition based on the recognizing
jurisdiction’s view of the illegality of the claim underlying the judgment). Judgments of foreign
countries do not receive full faith and credit treatment, and generally enjoy a bit less respect in U.S.
courts than do domestic judgments. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. In fact, some contexts even reveal
considerable evidence of disrespect where the foreign judgments do not reflect U.S. policy choices. See,
e.g., SPEECH ACT of 2010, 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (2013) (prohibiting recognition of foreign judgments that
do not comply with freedom of communication principles as reflected in the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and as reflected in the law of the state of the United States in which the judgment is
sought to be enforced and recognized). Nonetheless, foreign judgments do enjoy greater respect in U.S.
courts than foreign law as a general matter, which, if considered at all, will be honored only if choice of
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So why the solicitude for judgments? Perhaps one can trace this to
an Anglo-American reverence for courts. In United States
government and culture, judges are treated very well—we put them
in special robes, elevate them onto benches, call them “Your Honor,”
grant them special contempt powers, and allow them to dispatch
many of their governmental duties in secret. Moreover, their orders
are protected by the collateral bar rule, requiring parties to challenge
orders through appeal only and subject themselves to punishment for
contempt if in fact they choose to disregard an order without
pursuing an appeal.97 One explanation for this special regard for
judgments might posit that judicial orders draw a line in the sand:
commanding specific parties to do specific things. In this way, the
judicial orders actually implement the rule of law itself. It is here, at
the point of a judicial decision when the court applies general
principles to individual behavior, where government makes
absolutely clear that the law applies to specific citizens, and that the
citizens’ failure to comply with the law dangerously flouts
governmental power. Hence, the strict rules governing recognition of
judgments: to venerate and protect this judicial exercise of
governmental power—the tailoring of legal principles to individual
conduct—preserves the rule of law itself.
II. USING CONFLICT OF LAWS TO EXPOSE FEDERALISM’S REALITIES
Legal thinkers in the United States often view Conflict of Laws as
a federalism problem.98 The dominant perspective sees Conflicts as
confronting almost exclusively interstate relations issues, exposing a
morass of clashing state laws roughly supervised by federal
constitutional guarantees. Thus, a rich body of scholarship, treatises,
and casebooks explores various U.S. state laws and techniques for
law analysis suggests that it is the most appropriate law to apply. For an overview of the treatment of
foreign law and foreign judgment in U.S. courts as the law of a sister state, see Little, supra note 16, at
191–94, 963–68, 984–87 (2013).
97. John R.B. Palmer, Note, Collateral Bar and Contempt: Challenging a Court Order After
Disobeying It, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2002).
98. See, e.g., Little, supra note 76.
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resolving conflicts among them.99 That said, there remain important
federalism angles on the material that may be usefully mined for
salient and enlightening insights on the discipline. One contemporary
angle is highly focused: the topic of same-sex marriage. The other
topics that promise to clarify the dynamics of federalism in the
United States are less subject-specific. These concern (1) the modes
of regulation among the constituent parts of a federalist union and (2)
the lessons arising from federalism’s creation of forum choice for
litigants. I explore these immediately below.
A. Same-Sex Marriage: A Paradigm of Federalism’s Power
Struggles?
Few would doubt that in contemporary times, same-sex marriage
has created one of the most powerful case studies in federalism.
Same-sex marriage presents a diverse cross-section of state laws:
marriage-equality laws, marriage-recognition laws, state public
policy statutes prohibiting marriage recognition, and laws providing
marriage “equivalents,” such as domestic partnerships and civil
unions. From a federalism perspective, this diversity presents
enormous challenges. On the one hand is the pressure to recognize a
marriage valid in the place where it was celebrated. The stakes are
high with marriage recognition: emotional stability, children,
inheritance, health care, taxes, and other myriad spousal rights all
hang in the balance. Common sense compels a strong orientation
toward uniformity: persons validly married in one jurisdiction should
be deemed validly married everywhere. On the other hand are the
moral and religious differences that same-sex marriage implicates.
One of federalism’s virtues is its ability to allow diversity to flourish.
From this perspective, federalism should strive to accommodate a
peaceful coexistence of diverse views as they are reflected in wildly
varying laws promulgated by a diverse citizenry. This presents two
horns of a dilemma: should uniformity or diversity carry the day? Is
there a consensus, or half measure, that can keep the peace? Here lies
99. See, e.g., LITTLE, supra note 16.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss2/1

30

: Conflict of Laws Structure and Vision: Updating a Venerable Disci

2015]

CONFLICT OF LAWS STRUCTURE AND VISION

261

a central function of Conflict of Laws: to provide a reasoned
mechanism for resolving differences among states, for tolerating
diversity, and for promoting respectful interstate relations.
Existing literature covers same-sex marriage in great depth.
Although the literature might connect same-sex marriage issues with
Conflict of Laws more fruitfully than it has done, many scholars have
done so.100 Same-sex marriage deserves highlighting, not only for its
inherent importance, but also for its ability to illustrate federalism’s
many dimensions. With a rapidly occurring series of decisions
striking down same-sex marriage bans as unconstitutional, we are
approaching a threshold where same-sex marriage debates may have
historical interest only.101 Nonetheless, the parallels between
struggles over same-sex marriage and historical struggles over
slavery deserve attention. Marriage is a status defined by state law,
just as slavery was a status defined by state law.102 Contemporary
controversy still surrounds whether, and to what extent, the federal
government should reach beyond its umpiring functions and inject
federal principles to resolve same-sex marriage controversies.103
Same-sex marriage’s historical analogue with slavery is far from
direct, but the federalism parallels are striking and deserve
contemplation.
The Conflict of Laws history of governing same-sex marriage
disputes is enlightening. At the time the Restatement (First) of
Conflict of Laws was written in the 1930s, the drafters likely did not
anticipate how its rules might apply to same-sex marriage issues. In
fact, the same-sex marriage movement did not become widespread
until the 1970s.104 Once the movement took hold, legal principles
100. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform
Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 434–35 (2005) (evaluating relevance of Full Faith and Credit
Clause to marriage recognition).
101. See, e.g., Searcy ex. rel. K.S. v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2014 WL 4322396 (S.D. Ala. Aug.
28, 2014).
102. Grossman, supra note 100, at 434–35 (discussing recognition of state laws in relation to samesex marriage); Jane E. Larson, “A House Divided”: Using Dred Scott to Teach Conflict of Laws, 27 U.
TOL. L. REV. 577, 578–79 (1996) (outlining choice of law treatments of slavery as a human status).
103. See Grossman, supra note 100, at 436, 454–55 (discussing the application of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to same-sex marriage recognition uniformly across state lines).
104. See Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then
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such as the Restatement (First) rules, more modern choice of law
rules, and myriad other laws needed to be interpreted, reinterpreted,
challenged, and sometimes discarded as issues arose regarding the
legitimacy and effect of unions between individuals of the same sex.
Whenever social, political, or technological change occurs,
existing legal rules must accommodate—sometimes dramatically.
The same-sex marriage movement produced particularly far-reaching
consequences because marriage has so many aspects in human
society and individual existence. First and foremost, marriage reflects
rules regarding partner selection. While many of those rules are
informally defined and culturally enforced, some—such as those
regarding age of consent to marry—are codified.105 Other aspects of
marriage include (1) procedures for formalizing the partners’
commitment to the marriage106 (including licensing as well as civil
and religious wedding rituals); (2) the economic and financial rules
for forming a partnership, running a household, owning property, and
rearing children; and (3) the principles and procedures governing
dissolution107 (including dissolution either by reason of death and
volition). Because the United States’ family law system treats
marriage as a legal status, rather than a contractual relationship,
partners do not have the prerogative to enunciate all of their own
rules governing their marriage.108 Rather, they must accept rules
prescribed by law and culture. Indeed, their decision to “marry”
includes a decision to be bound by preexisting rules, which
accompanies a request that the government grant imprimatur on the
marriage union.
The mosaic of laws governing same-sex unions in the United
States created a rat’s nest of chaos and confusion. Adding to the
uncertainty, state laws became a moving target, frequently changing
and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (2009) (citing June 1969 as the “birth of the modern gay rights
movement”).
105. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 19-3-2 (2010).
106. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 19-3-30 (2010).
107. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 19-5-1 (2010).
108. See Nora Flum, Constituting Status: An Analysis of the Operation of Status in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 58, 80 (2011) (“Marriage is constituted as a status, not
contractual, relationship, and it is this legal status that gives it social status (rank).”).
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as American society struggled toward equilibrium on the issue.
Moreover, as the lives of transgendered individuals have become
visible, additional issues have arisen as laws wrestled with issues
raised by gender transitions, gender reassignment surgery, and
ambiguous gender.
Conflict of Laws issues arise from all these aspects of marriage.
Many legal issues, including property ownership, rights to spousal
benefits, and inheritance, turn on the question of whether a marriage
is valid. This question often presents courts with the task of deciding
which set of state law rules governing validity should prevail. If, after
evaluating competing laws, a court determines that the governing law
validates the marriage, then the court next must determine how that
status affects the particular matter in dispute. (So, for example, a
determination that two individuals are married can result in the
court’s awarding inheritance rights to a putative spouse rather than a
child of the deceased.) Overlaid on the choice of law issue on
marriage validity is the question of marriage recognition. Even
though a jurisdiction may not deem a marriage valid under its own
laws, the jurisdiction may choose nonetheless to recognize another
jurisdiction’s view that the parties are married. Why would a
jurisdiction extend such recognition? Several important motivations
could be at work: deference to a sister state, understanding of the
need for uniformity of legal regulation, or respect for the individual
rights of parties who are claiming the status of spouses.
But of course state choice of law principles are not the end of the
story. Fundamental individual rights, protected by the United States
Constitution, also have a crucial role to play in Conflict of Laws.
Privacy, consensual sexual relations, and marriage are all
components of human life and society, which the Constitution
protects.109 Same-sex marriage not only presents important issues
relating to accommodating difference in state laws, but also presents
a compelling case study of federal supervision of state laws. Enter the
109. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510
(1965) (“The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746, as protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of
a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”).
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concept of federal supremacy. As of now, the United States Supreme
Court has tread carefully, but the Court’s decision in United States v.
Windsor suggested that the Court is willing to grapple with the issue
head on, and that Court has now provided itself with an opportunity
to do so very soon.110 And finally is the umpiring function of the
federal government as reflected in the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the Constitution’s Article IV. This provision does not address directly
the rights of the individuals, who wish to enjoy the status of being
married, but instead regulates the structure of government.
Stipulating the deference due from one state to the legal prerogatives
of another state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause thus directly
regulates the circumstances under which one state must recognize a
marriage celebrated and solemnized in another state.111 While well
studied by scholars in and out of the same-sex marriage context,112
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is an important component of
understanding the federalism dynamics intrinsic in domestic Conflict
of Laws issues.

110. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Specifically, the Windsor Court ruled that the federal Defense of
Marriage Act’s restriction violated individual rights of those married under state law recognizing samesex marriage:
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect
to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons
as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 2696.
On January 16, 2015, the Court consolidated four same-sex marriage cases and granted a writ of
certiorari in these cases limited to the following questions:
1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a
marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed
and performed out-of-state?
Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 WL 213646, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015); Tanco v. Haslam, No.
14-562, 2015 WL 213648, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 14-574, 2015 WL
213651, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015).
111. See generally Grossman, supra note 100.
112. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
620 (1954) (describing obligation of one court to enforce land decrees entered by another court);
Grossman, supra note 100 (evaluating relevance of Full Faith and Credit Clause to marriage
recognition); Sterk, supra note 94 (evaluating Full Faith and Credit principles in the context of workers’
compensation decrees).
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B. Loci and Modes of Regulation: Laboratories of Experiment
Same-sex marriage provides an informative view on the diversity
of normative judgments about state law matters informing a Conflict
of Laws thinker’s understanding of federalism. Same-sex marriage,
of course, is just one example of a topic for which U.S. laws
represent diverse viewpoints. Other varying policies and goals
reflected within state law range from tort, contract, and property to
probate and procedure.113 On a more macro level, academics, judges,
regulators, and students also stand to learn a tremendous amount
about styles and modes of regulation. Indeed, one of the most salient
qualities of the federalist system is the diverse styles and approaches
states embrace in regulating a social problem. The approaches can
vary in how states choose to allocate authority between state and
local governments.114 States might also diverge in how they interpret
the scope of federal law in a particular area. Additionally, upon
recognizing the need for law to protect against a particular social
harm, different jurisdictions shape regulatory policy in different
ways. For example, states may choose administrative law, civil law,
or criminal law mechanisms to address a particular problem—or a
combination of all three.115 Differences in approach to procedural or
remedial mechanisms, such as class action apparatus, can create
significant choice of law issues as well.116
Public health scholarship reflects a robust understanding of how
state regulations often vary according to whether they take an
interventional approach or a less direct route to curing a problem
through such methods as tax incentives or infrastructure changes.117
113. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text for discussion of the opportunity to evaluate
regulatory goals.
114. See infra note 122 for a discussion of the difference between Pennsylvania and New York in
regulating hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale.
115. For an example of how a state’s decision to regulate using the criminal law, but not the civil law,
can influence choice of law analysis, see Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976).
116. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (resolving
dispute over differences between New York and federal class action rules).
117. James Macinko & Diana Silver, Improving State Health Policy Assessment: An Agenda for
Measurement and Analysis, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 1697, 1697 (Sept. 2012) (contrasting direct
interventional regulation with regulation that focuses on incidental laws and laws that affect
infrastructure). For further illustrations of the divergent approaches that states take to public health
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Likewise, public health scholars have also observed a pattern
whereby some states comprehensively legislate to regulate a
particular problem, while others take a more incremental approach.118
One might imagine, for example, myriad Conflict of Laws problems
pertaining to sports-related, traumatic brain injury. Questions might
include: who bears liability for the brain injury, whether a “clearance
to play sports” decision was reasonably given in a particular
circumstance, and whether institutional policies and training are
adequate.119
A different, although equally informative, illustration of federalism
dynamics emerges from the controversy over regulating hydraulic
fracturing in the Marcellus Shale by Pennsylvania and New York.120
In terms of regulatory conflict, the controversy implicates the
regulatory power of no less than three states, the federal government,
and a trans-jurisdictional regulatory entity.121 This type of hybrid
regulation, see www.lawatlas.org (providing a policy surveillance portal for public health regulation).
This contrast in regulatory approach is also reflected in divergent approaches to regulating hydraulic
fracturing in the Marcellus Shale by Pennsylvania and New York. See infra note 122 for further
discussion of hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale.
118. Macinko & Silver, supra note 117, at 1698 (discussing differences in comprehensiveness in state
regulation of such problems as automobile crashes, tobacco use, and alcohol addiction).
119. Hosea H. Harvey, Reducing Brain Injuries in Youth Sports: Youth Sports Traumatic Brain Injury
State Laws, January 2009–December 2012, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1249 (July 2013) (surveying
dramatic variations on state regulatory response to youth traumatic brain injuries). See also Hosea H.
Harvey, Refereeing the Public Health, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 66 (2014).
120. See infra note 122.
121. See Ross H. Pifer, What a Short, Strange Trip It’s Been: Moving Forward After Five Years of
Marcellus Shale Development, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 615, 616 (2011); Lynn Kerr McKay et al., Science
and the Reasonable Development of Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Resources in Pennsylvania and New
York, 32 ENERGY L.J. 125, 126 (2011). The story of hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale is long
and tortuous. Here is a short version, made possible by the excellent research assistance and drafting of
Bradley Smith (Temple Law School Class of 2015): In 2008, state and local governments in
Pennsylvania and New York were forced to confront the regulation of the natural gas industry after an
improvement in drilling technology offered the opportunity to tap into natural gas deposits in the
Marcellus Shale. Pifer, supra at 627–32. Both states sought policies that would allow for economic
growth while protecting the environment; however, the respective approaches that New York and
Pennsylvania took varied greatly. McKay, supra at 126. Pennsylvania pursued what may be viewed as
an incremental or reactionary approach: as certain issues arose, Pennsylvania enacted solutions tailored
specifically to the problems caused by increased natural gas drilling. Pifer, supra at 658. At first,
Pennsylvania’s most prominent changes were increased supervision of the industry through more
inspectors and clarifying regulations. McKay, supra at 132–33. In 2012, Pennsylvania adopted a plan
enabling individual counties to choose to levy a designated impact fee on natural gas extraction, rather
than implement a state-wide severance tax as is used in other natural gas drilling states. Kris Maher,
Impact Fees Fracture Pennsylvania, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/
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regulation is common in the present era, and surely deserves a place
in contemporary thinking about Conflict of Laws.122
C. Forum Shopping Springs from Diversity
Federalism’s diversity in regulatory style and procedure creates an
unintended consequence: the incentive to forum shop. While forum
shopping is routinely regarded as a blight on procedural systems, the
truth is that the Conflict of Laws discipline tacitly teaches lawyers
how to forum shop and encourages them to do so. Those mastering
Conflicts doctrines become keen to the strategic advantages of
evaluating substantive and procedural differences among
jurisdictions. Such is the reality of many types of “lawyers’ law”:
insiders who understand law’s complicated underbelly also know
how to exploit it. An ethical response is to sensitize lawyers to the
inequities caused by diversity among jurisdictions, which are
reinforced and enhanced by forum shopping practices. In short,
forum shopping behaviors deserve thought and attention. While
Conflict of Laws scholars have extensively studied various aspects of
forum shopping within the last few years,123 more general research
articles/SB10001424127887323551004578438982990838720?mg=reno64-wsj.
By contrast, New York chose to regulate through an expansive moratorium on natural gas
drilling early in the Marcellus Shale boom. McKay, supra at 128. In contrast to Pennsylvania, New
York declined to enact smaller bits of legislation periodically. Id. at 127–28. New York’s Department of
Environmental Conservation had begun to revise requirements for permitting natural gas drilling when
the New York legislature and executive took preemptive actions to temporarily eliminate all drilling in
the state. Id. at 128. New York has treated the Marcellus Shale controversy as a uniquely state issue,
concluding that the state can dictate to cities and towns what they may do. Peter J. Kiernan, An Analysis
of Hydrofracturing Gubernatorial Decision Making, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 769, 781–82 (2012).
Whereas Pennsylvania enacted narrow legislation and deferred to localities for some matters, New York
took broad action at the state level.
This topic also presents interesting implications for the scope of federal governance. On one
hand, not readily apparent, controlling federal authority exists because the National Safe Drinking Water
Act excludes hydraulic fracturing (a matter of ongoing debate). Pifer, supra at 644. Nonetheless, eastern
Pennsylvania and a small part of New York are regulated by the Delaware River Basin Commission, a
regional commission established by the governors of Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
and the federal government. Id. at 642 n.179. The Delaware River Basin Commission has imposed a de
facto moratorium on drilling in the area it regulates, which affects Pennsylvania much more than it does
New York. See McKay, supra at 131–32. Therefore, Pennsylvania currently submits itself to federal
control more than New York does.
122. See, e.g., McKay, supra note 121; Pifer, supra note 121.
123. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent from Shady Grove,
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 32 (2010) (using venue transfer as an example of procedural mechanisms

Published by Reading Room, 2015

37

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1

268

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

would benefit world procedural systems. Moreover, the topic could
have a greater role to play in Conflict of Laws courses and other
thinkers—such as legislators, practicing lawyers, and judges—are
well advised to consider its prevalence and consequences.
From a legal practice perspective, Conflict of Laws cases have a
dominant message: the forum where a lawsuit is filed enormously
influences which party ultimately succeeds.124 A particular forum can
provide practical, logistical, and procedural advantages for one
litigant and potentially serious disadvantages for others. Simple
matters as familiarity with layout of a courthouse building, knowing
where to get documents duplicated, and enjoying the comfort of
sleeping in one’s own bed during a protracted trial can impact
litigation success. Likewise, forum courts tend to favor applying their
own law governing the rights of the parties to a lawsuit.125 This
choice of law influence on litigation’s bottom line can be huge.
As the litigants who file the papers initiating suit, plaintiffs exert
considerable control over where a lawsuit is filed.126 The
consequences of forum choice give plaintiffs an incentive to shop far
and wide for the place that delivers the optimum balance among
convenience, reduced legal barriers to litigation, favorable
substantive legal regulation, and helpful court procedures. One might
justify the prerogative of forum choice as an appropriate trade-off for
the burden that plaintiffs must generally bear in proving the elements
of their case. That does not, however, dismiss further consideration
of the consequences of forum choice.

that work with Erie to expand opportunities for forum shopping); Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1116–17 (2010) (discussing
reaction of other countries to what may be viewed as the U.S. courts’ aggressive use of forum
manipulation tools such as forum non conveniens); Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a
Trade and Investment Issue, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2008) (analyzing how differences among
adjudicatory results in different jurisdictions can distort trade and investment behavior); Christopher A.
Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011) (presenting findings
on forum shopping trends).
124. Whytock, supra note 123, at 498.
125. Id. at 493.
126. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 123.
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Plaintiffs encounter at least one formidable check on their ability
to file in an optimum forum: personal jurisdiction restrictions.127
Competently represented defendants are unlikely to waive personal
jurisdiction challenges, and courts tend to take seriously the
constitutional minimums required for asserting personal jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in today’s mobile and globally integrated world,
defendants often have contacts that provide a constitutionally
sufficient basis to support personal jurisdiction in several
jurisdictions. Together with a lawyer’s increased ability to litigate
outside her home jurisdiction, this increased ability to maneuver
around personal jurisdiction limitations makes forum shopping a
reality now more than ever.128
Forum shopping may involve a number of alternatives: the choice
between United States courts and courts of foreign countries, the
choice among courts of foreign countries, the choice between federal
courts in the United States and state courts in the United States, and
the choice among different state courts in the United States.
Phenomena such as libel tourism129 outside the United States and the
status of the United States as a magnet forum130 for many types of
litigation provide important case studies on the interaction of world
procedural systems and inequities in standards of justice. Yet focus
on domestic, U.S. forum shopping alone discloses important lessons.
Not only do the details of forum shopping give realism and
currency to Conflict of Laws issues, but these details are important to
understanding of the consequences of routine law practice and a large
range of matters pertinent to regulatory reform. An informed decision
about what, if any, preventative action to take against forum
shopping requires appreciation of the forces that create the practice as
127. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 110–11 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2012).
128. Whytock, supra note 123, at 492–93.
129. For analysis of the incentive for libel plaintiffs to file suit outside the United States, see generally
Laura E. Little, Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International
Law for the United States, 14 EUR. Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 181 (2012) (surveying libel tourism
developments and the reaction of the United States); Daniel C. Taylor, Libel Tourism: Protecting
Authors and Preserving Comity, 99 GEO. L.J. 189 (2010) (focusing on free speech ramifications of libel
tourism).
130. See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 294–95 (6th
ed. 2010) (using “magnet forum” to describe foreign plaintiffs’ attraction to U.S. courts).
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well as the reasons why it is generally condemned. Some contexts for
forum shopping present easy judgments: consider, for example, a
party’s decision to litigate in a particular jurisdiction to benefit from
the jurisdiction’s widespread corruption. Certainly this is not a forum
shopping practice deserving of respect. In most cases, however, the
causes and effects of forum shopping are more subtle and
complicated, and the decision whether government should actively
seek to ward off its occurrence may require fine-tuned evaluation of
specific facts.
For the purpose of evaluating the federalism implications of forum
shopping, one must understand that litigant incentives and strategic
behavior do not operate alone. Forums themselves may host (or
encourage) forces that attract or repel litigation.131 These forces relate
to matters such as (i) a desire to foster economic benefits in a
particular locale or a particular population group within the locale;
(ii) cultural characteristics reflected in court systems that prefer one
type of litigant over another; (iii) local preferences for greater or
lesser damages; and (iv) intended or unintended byproducts of
regulatory schemes. Sometimes these forces combine to empower
particular jurisdictions to lure court filings for a disproportionate
percentage of cases in a particular category.
1. Choices Among Federal Courts
Within the United States, a variety of forums attract specific cases
and litigants. Take the unlikely example of a small Texas town,
Marshall, Texas, with an impressive record for attracting patent
litigation: in 2005, its United States District Court entertained more
patent lawsuits than federal district courts in San Francisco, Chicago,
New York City, and Washington.132 What’s the draw of Marshall,
Texas? The answer seems to be a rocket docket combined with
plaintiff-friendly verdicts.133 What’s the apparent benefit for the
town? Increased real estate investment and greater business for hotels
131. Whytock, supra note 123, at 498.
132. Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, § 3, at 1.
133. Id. at 9.
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and restaurants.134 Marshall, Texas, is not alone. In a wholly different
context, analysts have also pointed out a possible economic incentive
at work as jurisdictions considered whether to recognize same-sex
marriage.135 This would seem particularly true of jurisdictions with
an established tourism infrastructure, which would benefit from outof-state citizens, traveling to marry and then honeymoon in the samesex marriage jurisdiction.136
Disclosing similar findings, scholars have identified powerful
forces within the federal system that render specific judicial districts
more attractive to bankruptcy filings than other districts.137 Indeed,
this bankruptcy venue issue has proven a lightning rod for
controversy—well known to bankruptcy scholars and practitioners—
but has not been widely linked with larger policy issues of forum
shopping and Conflict of Laws.138
134. Id. at 8. Another notable example of a forum known for plaintiff-friendly verdicts is Texarkana,
Texas, which provides unique opportunities for forum shopping within the same locale. DISCOVER OUR
TOWN, http://www.discoverourtown.com/AR/Texarkana/Attractions/172184.html (last visited October
27, 2014) (explaining that Texarkana is home to “[t]he only federal building in the country sited in two
states and the only federal courthouse located in two circuits, the 5th and the 8th, and two districts, the
Eastern District of Texas and the Western District of Arkansas”).
135. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 780–86 (1995) (analyzing economic incentives for states to
recognize same-sex marriage).
136. Id. at 769–72.
137. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate
Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 402 (2006) (reporting on observations that “[a] high
repeat filing rate first afflicted two ‘magnet’ venues, the District of Delaware and the Southern District
of New York, then spread nationwide as other judges have tried to attract cases to their own courts”).
138. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 137 (2005). In writings inspiring considerable controversy, Professor Lynn
LoPucki has argued that United States bankruptcy courts compete fiercely with each other, resulting in a
dramatic chain of consequences stemming from forum shopping:
[C]ourt competition is an active, deliberate response by the court to forum shopping.
When courts compete, they change what they are doing to make themselves more
attractive to forum shoppers. . . . The court that offers forum shoppers the most may be
the only one that gets cases in the end, but all of the judges who compete are corrupted
along way.
Id.
Why do judges compete so aggressively for bankruptcy cases? LoPucki cites judicial desire for
prestige, professional satisfaction, and self-preservation. Lynn M. LoPucki, Response, Where Do You
Get Off? A Reply to Courting Failure’s Critics, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 511, 512 (2006) (reviewing arguments
about why bankruptcy judges are under pressure and how they respond to the pressure). According to
LoPucki, judges wish to appease powerful members of the bankruptcy bar and the business
community—who act as “case placers”—so that the judges can attract big, interesting cases to their
venues. Id. at 513. Moreover, since bankruptcy judges are not appointed for life, they depend for their
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2. Choices Among State Courts
Forum differences and resulting forum shopping are not confined
to federal courts. Indeed, the differences are equally pronounced for
litigants choosing among state courts.139 Not only are some states
more attractive to plaintiffs (and less attractive to defendants) than
others, but specific locations—counties, cities, and towns—can
garner nationwide reputations among litigants. For example, the
United States Chamber of Commerce periodically evaluates state
liability systems, scrutinizing factors such as treatment of class
actions, punitive and other damages, timeliness, discovery and
evidentiary policies, judges’ impartiality and competence, as well as
jury predictability and fairness.140 Surveying attorneys’ opinions
about these matters, the Chamber identified strong jurisdictional
preferences, including fine-tuned preferences that distinguished
among different counties and cities within states.141 In addition, states
also develop reputations for expertise in specific subject matters,
whether they be corporate law (Delaware), entertainment matters
(New York and California), insurance law (Connecticut), or another
subject.142

reappointment on the support of the local bankruptcy bar, particularly powerful members of the bar,
who influence where cases are filed and benefit from practicing in a forum with robust bankruptcy
activity. Id. LoPucki argues that the judges compete for more bankruptcy business by making rulings
that affect professional fees, trustee appointments, conflicts of interests, and taxes—matters that are
sufficiently important to the business community and bankruptcy bar to influence where bankruptcy
petitions are filed. Id. at 514–15.
It should be noted that many of LoPucki’s claims are contested by other bankruptcy scholars.
See, e.g., William C. Whitford, Venue Choice: Where the Action Is, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 321, 321–22
(2006). His observations, however, raise important concerns about how self-interest and power can be
tied to the ability of litigants to forum shop.
139. Hay, supra note 36, at 620.
140. Humphrey Taylor, 2007 U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study,
2007 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 6–8.
141. Id. at 18. The respondents ranked Delaware, Nebraska, and New Hampshire as “best” in their
treatment of tort and contract litigation and West Virginia, Louisiana, and Mississippi as “worst.” Id. at
21. In addition, they zeroed in on Los Angeles, California, and Chicago/Cook County, Illinois, as the
cities and counties with the least fair and reasonable litigation environment. Id. at 18.
142. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 661, 698 (2008) (Delaware); CONN. INS. L.J., http://insurancejournal.org/?page_id=17 (last
visited Oct. 27, 2014) (Connecticut); Kirk T. Schroder, Entertainment Law: Some Practice
Considerations for Beginners, 13 ENT. & SPORTS L. 8, 9 (1996) (California & New York).
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Aside from explicit differences in procedural and substantive laws,
states can also be more or less attractive to litigants because of nonlaw related factors such as infrastructure. Consider, for example,
instances where a jurisdiction might offer a substantive legal
advantage for high stakes trials, but, for various reasons, does not
provide the “brick and mortar” comforts that usually accompany such
events. In one case, a Walt Disney Company shareholder trial in
downstate (Georgetown) Delaware required big city lawyers to create
temporary offices in old houses and beach hotels, a task that included
paying to upgrade electrical systems to accommodate the high-tech
photocopiers and other equipment.143 Presumably Georgetown,
Delaware, presented a dilemma for the lawyers: judicial subject
matter expertise, infrastructure support, and attorney comfort all hung
in the balance.144
3. Choices Between State and Federal Courts
And of course there are classic forum shopping issues raised by
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in federal courts and the Erie
doctrine.145 While this is perhaps the most well-known and wellstudied example of forum choice, several subtle—yet potentially
important—issues usually escape attention. Of particular note for the
Conflict of Laws theorist are the consequences of the rule that a
federal district court must apply the choice of laws rules of the forum
state to resolve state law conflicts.146 Could this rule actually
exacerbate forum shopping by allowing federal procedural
mechanisms to expand a litigant’s possibilities for benefitting from
favorable state laws?147 At least one scholar has pointed out that Erie
143. Maureen Milford, Big-City Lawyers on the Road Scrape for Office Space, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2004, at C6.
144. See id.
145. Borchers, supra note 123, at 30.
146. Id. at 30.
147. Id. at 32 (using venue transfer as an example of procedural mechanisms that work with Erie to
expand opportunities for forum shopping); see also Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and
Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 139–40 (2011) (noting that for
class litigation, Erie and differences among state choice of law doctrines increase forum shopping
incentives).
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may have actually increased horizontal forum shopping148 by
eliminating a uniform “general law” that prevailed under Swift v.
Tyson.149 A related subtlety concerns how differences in state and
federal stare decisis policies can encourage forum shopping.150 Some
suggest that differences in how federal and state courts view state
court precedent can make federal courts more attractive than state
courts, where a litigant seeks to benefit from likely, but not yet
formalized, legal changes.151
Yet a final, related, and frequently overlooked forum shopping
phenomenon concerns the obligation of state courts to apply federal
law, which is sometimes called the “reverse-Erie” problem.152 While
definitions of the reverse-Erie issue vary, one helpful approach
confines the reverse-Erie doctrine to matters bearing on the conduct
of litigation, embracing the view that the doctrine simply requires
state courts to apply federal practices that are closely interwoven with
“the relevant federal claim, despite the existence of conflicting state
procedures.”153 Under reverse-Erie, a lawyer’s forum shopping
opportunities may be expanded, since the lawyer can use a state
system while benefitting from federal practice rules, even though the
148. Sherry, supra note 147, at 138–39. “Horizontal” forum shopping refers in this instance to
choosing among federal district courts situated in different states. Id.
149. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). See Sherry, supra note 147, at 141 (arguing that lack of uniformity between
state and federal court is worse under Erie than under Swift because federal courts under Swift had
developed a body of “cohesive and coherent” general laws).
150. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 218 (Aspen Publishers
5th ed. 2006).
151. See, e.g., id. at 227–28 (arguing that federal district courts have more latitude in anticipating
changes in the law than state courts, which must follow strict stare decisis policy in adhering to a
decision of a state supreme court).
152. See Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 1237, 1251–61 (2011) (discussing a parallel phenomenon relating to state courts’ obligations to
follow the law of other states and pointing out that states often do not follow this obligation faithfully
and instead indulge the dubious assumption that a foreign state’s law is the same as forum law).
Professor Green’s observations raise the specter of even greater incentives for forum shopping among
state courts. Id.
153. Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges
under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1232 (2011). Other definitions of the
reverse-Erie doctrine are broader, encompassing the mandate that “federal law—be it constitutional,
statutory, or common law—will apply pursuant to the Supremacy Clause in state court, subject to the
Constitution or Congress having already chosen the applicable law, whenever it preempts state law or
whenever it prevails by an Erie-like judicial choice of law.” Kevin Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 44 (2006).
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federal court system would clearly be available because the suit
arises under federal law.154
In sum, forum shopping is a complex phenomenon, implicating
“micro” concerns, such as hotel space and electrical capacity at real
estate surrounding courthouses, as well as “macro” concerns such as
judicial corruption, global economic performance, stare decisis
policy, and the effects of cross-border transactions on the power of
national governments.155 Forum shopping is intimately tied to
Conflicts of Law and, as such, deserves significant attention from
Conflicts analysts. Perhaps the myriad variables influencing litigation
success are so complicated and interdependent as to render foolhardy
a lawyer’s attempt to account for them all. Nonetheless, these factors
merit close scrutiny, especially where they implicate a key part of
litigation success—such as the opportunity to avoid highly
unfavorable governing law by changing the applicable choice of law
analysis, the possibility to benefit from potential changes in state law,
or the possibility to change the identity of the fact-finder (judge or
jury).
III. USING CONFLICT OF LAWS TO EXPLORE GOVERNMENT IN THE
GLOBAL ERA
In the United States, we conceptualize Conflict of Laws most often
as a domestic matter. This could hardly be described as a
misconceived travesty: with the different laws of fifty states,
territories, local governments, and a federal government, the United
States faces a significant challenge managing domestic conflicts. One
also can argue that a nation’s success depends first on its ability to
keep its own house in order. Accordingly, our nation’s primary focus
on creating effective mechanisms for resolving internal clashes
among domestic laws is both defensible and rational. But to ignore
the relationship among the laws of various nations forgoes an
154. See Clermont supra note 153, at 44.
155. See, e.g., Fleur Johns, Performing Party Autonomy, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (2008)
(discussing these macro concerns in the context of contractual choice of forum and choice of law
clauses).
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important opportunity to understand sovereign power struggles as
well as cultural differences among the world’s people. Moreover, the
transnational forces that influence litigation behavior of international
actors reveal important insights into the variety of national
procedural systems. Understanding these transnational forces not
only educates U.S. thinkers about practices in the rest of the world,
but also provides insights into the nature of the U.S. system. Finally,
situating Conflict of Laws within an international frame brings out
puzzling, yet fundamental, questions about the relationship among
Conflict of Laws and other forms of international law as well as the
nature of sovereignty itself.
A. Transnational Conflicts: Globalism in a Traditional Context
By design, Conflict of Laws envisions competing governmental
systems. To concentrate solely on domestic regulatory competition
suggests a parochialism that is out of step with contemporary
individual, government, and business behavior. One need only
consider the magnitude of internet activity conducted across borders
to appreciate the importance of understanding transnational Conflicts
principles. In terms of pedagogy, law practice, and legal scholarship,
confining Conflicts thinking to domestic problems sends the wrong
message about the relationship of the United States with the rest of
the world.156
Lawyerly and scholarly focus on legal conflicts among different
nations provides an opportunity to appreciate varying modes and
styles of regulation. The result may be a better understanding of the
various incentives and goals of various laws. With this
understanding, more harmonious relationships—commercial or
otherwise—may develop. A focus on other countries’ laws may also
educate judges, lawyers, and academics in the U.S. about aspects of

156. For a discussion of the importance of raising globalism topics in the classroom, see generally
Carole Silver, Getting Real About Globalization and Legal Education: Potential and Perspectives for
the U.S., 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 457 (2013); Catherine Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 160 (2004).
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alternative systems that lawmakers might favorably borrow or imitate
for improving domestic U.S. regulation.
The topics through which Conflicts thinkers might study
transnational differences are vast. As an example, I begin with one
topic particularly important to legal professionals: the (frequently
overlooked) Conflict of Laws issues pertaining to regulating lawyers
engaged in transnational law practice. Not only does this topic relate
to important professional responsibility concerns arising from
multijurisdictional practice, but it also brings to light the variety of
modes of lawyer regulation throughout the world. Might the United
States learn from focusing on these differences? As legal practice
globalizes and the market for U.S. legal services continues to suffer,
should we consider following the trend toward deregulation of
lawyers embraced in the United Kingdom? Alternatively, might we
consider a national uniform regulation of lawyers—as is evidenced in
many legal systems around world—or a licensing approach similar to
the U.S. scheme for driver’s licenses—as evidenced by the lawyer
licensing scheme used in Canada.157 At the very least, focus on this
variety in regulation might educate U.S. lawmakers about the current
insularity of U.S. lawyer regulation and the competitive advantages
enjoyed by foreign lawyers operating under more liberal licensing
schemes.
Appreciating the variety of lawyer licensing schemes may have
important professional and economic consequences for United States
lawyers. In the context of litigation, however, those issues tend to
provide a sideshow distraction, rather than the “main event” for
controversy. Transnational issues also repeatedly pop up in the core
of legal disputes. Although courts sometimes explicitly consider
these transnational conflicts using standard choice of law analysis,158
that choice of law analysis is frequently lacking. A particularly
157. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 5–10
(2013) (describing various countries’ approaches to lawyer regulation and the liberalization of
regulations in England and Wales).
158. See, e.g., Dominican Republic v. AES Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 680, 693 (E.D. Va. 2006) (using
the First Restatement approach to consider whether Virginia, Florida, Puerto Rican, or Dominican law
governs a tort claim).
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salient example of ignoring choice of law analysis comes from cases
in which U.S. courts consider the unilateral (self-focused) question of
whether a U.S. regulatory scheme applies to a case with transnational
elements—cases presenting so-called questions of extraterritorial
application of United States law.
In a series of opinions, the United States Supreme Court has
developed a set of principles for extraterritorial application cases,
laying out concepts governing when federal law should apply to
entities and conduct outside the territorial limits of the United
States.159 While these cases present essentially the same problem as a
typical multilateral Conflict of Laws case with domestic and foreign
elements, the opinions barely hint at this overlap.160 Instead, they
speak from a hegemonic or empire model: unilaterally asking
whether the United States wants to—and can get away with—
applying its law to the dispute.161 Even if one were to reject any
notion that the United States “owes” other sovereigns careful
consideration of conflicting regulations using traditional Conflict of
Laws doctrines, one might surely accept that Conflicts doctrines
might enhance the quality of justice extended to litigants in
individual cases.
Choice of law analysis involving foreign country laws does more
than instruct on alternatives to domestic law. As argued by several
scholars, choice of law analysis can assist in appreciating the cultural
implications inherent in legal and political clashes, perhaps setting
the stage for greater acceptance—or peaceful co-existence.162 This is
159. E.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (evaluating the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (evaluating the
Sherman Act); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (evaluating Title VII).
160. See cases cited supra note 159. Instead, the opinions mention standards for extraterritorial
jurisdiction, including concerns with the location of conduct, participant nationality, domestic effects,
and comity. While these are concepts closely related to Conflict of Laws, the Court has neither
recognized nor capitalized on the connection. See cases cited supra note 140.
161. See, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 at 250–51 (deciding that statutory language and indications of
statutory intent were not sufficient to justify regulating foreign activities); Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509
U.S. at 769–70 (relying on principles of “international comity” to justify regulating foreign conduct).
162. Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 273–75 (2008). Riles
suggests that Conflict of Laws confronts human problems that extend beyond analytical puzzles
pertaining to political power, sources of formal authority, and individual rights. Id. at 274–77. Pointing
out that Conflicts grapples with cultural clashes, she observes that a forum court confronting a Conflicts
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a point important for domestic relations cases, which often implicate
sensitive cultural and moral issues that may or may not be unique to
the societies in which they arose.163 And, of course, looming large is
the well-documented, yet still evolving, context of internet
regulation—a context in which the appropriate form of Conflict of
Laws doctrines is still a matter of debate.164

case must evaluate and understand a foreign value system, a value system responsible for a legal rule in
variance with domestic law. Id. at 274–75. Riles notes that cultural value clashes appear in “seemingly
exotic disputes,” such as fights about enforcing “agreements stemming from Islamic banking practices,”
as well as in more “mundane” state tort litigation. Id. at 275. Riles observes that cultural conflicts are
generally “submerged” in standard choice of law doctrine. Id.
163. See generally Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to
Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (2012) (exploring
the usefulness of Conflicts doctrine in the domestic relations context); Reynolds, supra note 6 (outlining
the pedagogical benefits of teaching international family law in a general Conflict of Laws course).
Of particular interest is the question of how the formal structure of Conflicts doctrine
(particularly as manifest in judgments law) interacts with the cultural, moral, and emotional issues
triggered by family law. Does the formal structure of Conflicts doctrine in this area provide a good
vehicle for harnessing the challenges of domestic relations law? Does it empower courts to handle
questions of culture clash with detachment and precision? Alternatively, is there a bad fit between
conflicts and domestic relations law: with conflicts doctrine obscuring the “real battle” in the cases,
confusing the issues, or creating a smoke screen for subterfuge?
164. The literature on this important and difficult subject is appropriately wide-ranging and extensive.
Although I believe it merits further extensive study, many scholars, regulators, and practitioners
appreciate that message. I thus do not devote space here for further discussion of the topic. One
particularly salient debate in the literature concerns whether the internet calls for a special form of
regulation, reduced regulation, or existing forms of regulation. For a cross-section of existing writings,
see, for example, Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313 (2013) (outlining unique personal jurisdiction and choice of law concepts
for analyzing disputes involving cloud technology); Laura E. Little, Internet Choice of Law Governance,
China Private Int’l Law F. (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045070 (arguing that internet
governance issues require heightened attention and consideration of specialized rules); Little, supra note
129, at 186–87 (discussing how courts sometimes invoke standard choice of law methodology to
internet defamation cases); Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:
Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1823 (2005) (observing
tendency of courts to apply local law in transnational cyberspace disputes); Andrea Slane, Tales, Techs,
and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization, and the Legal Construction of Borderlessness
on the Internet, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 130 (2008) (stating that “courts in Internet cases
almost always confine conflicts issues to the exercise of . . . personal jurisdiction . . . [and] virtually
never engage in a full conflicts analysis”); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1376 (1996) (advocating a flexible, open ended view of
cyberspace governance).
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B. Conflict of Laws and International Law: Why Entirely Separate
Channels of Regulation?
A related and important, yet strangely uncharted, context for
Conflict of Laws thinking concerns the discipline’s interaction with
international law. Both Conflict of Laws doctrines and international
law contribute to a coordinated system of governance monitoring the
world’s affairs, affairs that include matters as complicated and
interrelated as nuclear energy, internet communication, human
migration, and climate change. Yet their relation to each other is
under-theorized.
Both disciplines track each other in important ways. For example,
classic international law doctrines include theories of jurisdiction
(jurisdiction to adjudicate, jurisdiction to prescribe, and jurisdiction
to enforce)165 that dovetail closely with the tripartite nature of
Conflict of Laws (personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and
judgments).166 Both Conflicts and international law regulate the same
basic problems. How far does a court’s adjudicative power reach?
What are the appropriate circumstances under which one
jurisdiction’s policies should dominate another? When is it
appropriate for a jurisdiction to impose its resolution of a dispute on
another jurisdiction? Yet, while these two subjects could inform and
guide each other on these issues, discussion of the overlap between
the two is largely absent: the relationship between Conflict of Laws
and international law remains elusive. One important task for
Conflict of Laws thinkers therefore is to situate Conflicts doctrines
within or alongside the broad scope of international law. Both
disciplines would stand to benefit from the effort.
One explanation for the silence about the relationship between
Conflicts and international law may be that international law tends to
escape precise definition. This results perhaps because international
law is vast, comprising at least three sets of principles and rules:
165. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987)
(describing these three categories of jurisdiction).
166. See generally EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (West 4th ed. 2004) (explaining
the three components of Conflicts: personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments).
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(1) those that operate among nations;167 (2) those that govern entities
interacting across national borders; and (3) those that sometimes
govern relationships that exist between a nation and entities within its
borders. Conflict of Laws is narrower.168 In fact, when Conflict of
Laws doctrines regulate interactions among different nation states,
the subject is usually regarded as a subset of international law.169
We generally regard the term “private international law” as a
synonym for Conflict of Laws doctrines operating in a transnational
setting. The reference to “private” in “private international law”
evokes the distinction between public and private spheres of
international law,170 which is now thought inaccurate and outmoded
by many scholars.171 The distinction still remains in current use,
however, in many places in the world.
General international law principles are more sweeping than
Conflict of Laws doctrines in other ways. Conflict of Laws doctrines
generally presume that some domestic law principle should provide
the central source of authority for dispute resolution.172 The task of
Conflicts principles then is to identify which domestic authority
should prevail where various domestic rules irreconcilably clash.
International law sometimes takes this task as its mission. But
international law also has greater aspirations, such as identifying
universal norms of human governance and establishing supranational
167. International law thinkers often use the more general term “states,” rather than “nations”—
nomenclature that potentially raises confusion for those working primarily with choice of law in the
United States.
168. See SCOLES, supra note 166, at 2–4.
169. See Craig Scott, “Transnational Law” as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions, 10 GER. L.J. 859,
869 n.16 (2009) (noting Conflicts doctrines take on the label “private international law,” where they
operate across national borders). Within a federalist system, the relationship among the component
sovereigns—e.g., “states” in the United States, “provinces” in Canada—is regulated by domestic
Conflict of Laws principles that do not usually have much “international” about them. Id.
170. Id. For an articulation of the distinction between private and public international law, see MARK
WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Aspen 5th ed. 2008) (explaining that public international law
“mostly concerns the political interactions of states” and private international law relates to “conflicts
and cooperation among national legal systems”).
171. Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1040
(2011) (stating that a private international law approach is “outdated”).
172. See JANIS, supra note 170, at 5. Sometimes domestic law may point to international law as the
source of authority, although this occurs less in the United States than in the European Union and
elsewhere. Id. at 4.
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institutions. In some instances, these institutions and norms are
designed to operate alongside the laws of nation states to have a
vertical relationship with them. Some advocate that international law
may have the effect of harmonizing domestic laws or creating hybrid
principles.173 Nonetheless, the ultimate result may allow international
law to dominate and suppress national law in the name of a superior
international norm—and not—as in the usual Conflict of Laws
context—in the name of peaceful horizontal relationships among
nation states.
As discussed above, Conflict of Laws principles are most often
creatures of common law. By contrast, international law has a variety
of sources. One view confines international law to principles
identified by consent among sovereigns, memorialized in treaties or
other formal instruments.174 Most, however, agree that custom also
gives rise to international legal principles.175 The absence of
principles such as universal norms and custom in Conflict of Laws
analysis may be an important contrast, calling for further thought.
Within the United States, state law is the major source of Conflict
of Laws doctrines, even where a choice of law dispute involves the
law of a foreign nation.176 United States constitutional principles
embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Supremacy
Clause provide some supervision of state choice of law doctrines.
The presence of these U.S. constitutional principles highlights
another important point about the relationship between international
law and Conflict of Laws: circumstances exist when international law
displaces Conflicts doctrines. The Supremacy Clause establishes that,
where applicable, U.S. treaty provisions must direct states to resolve
relevant Conflicts questions in a particular way.177 Accordingly,
international law instruments can displace otherwise applicable state
law Conflicts principles. Finally, certain types of international law
173. Id. at 5 (explaining that rules of international law blend “various forms of rulemaking conduct of
two or more states”).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 7.
177. See YEAZELL, supra note 127, at 64.
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principles, known as jus cogens, preemptory, or nonderogable norms,
act as “super law” that can override other sources of international
law.178 Examples of jus cogens rules include prohibitions against war
crimes, genocide, slavery, and torture.179 Where the result of a
domestic Conflict of Laws analysis might implicate a jus cogens
prohibition, one would expect Conflicts principles to yield to the jus
cogens principle, which the international community would regard as
a more fundamental tenet of human governance.
Despite differences between Conflict of Law doctrines and
international law, Conflicts thinkers should consider the synergy and
benefits that international law and Conflicts offer each other. After
all, Conflict of Laws doctrines and international law concern very
much the same question: what is the appropriate relation among
laws? Scholars have recognized that both Conflicts and international
law have “rules that determine whether a case with links to more than
one jurisdiction is governed by the law of the forum or the law of one
of those jurisdictions.”180 We see that international law may “trump”
Conflicts principles where those principles insufficiently protect jus
cogens principles or clash with an international instrument such as a
treaty. But perhaps Conflicts thinkers should consider other ways in
which the discipline might learn from, and thus benefit from,
international law. For example, Conflicts thinkers might consider
whether to incorporate into Conflicts doctrines themselves a set of
universal norms previously identified in international law that may
serve as tie-breakers in cases of irreconcilable conflict between
domestic laws.
As for the benefits that Conflicts doctrine offers international law,
domestic courts might find that Conflicts principles provide a formal,
rigorous, and often familiar way for them to consider and respect
international law, regarding it as true law, but without “simplifying”
178. See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS (3d ed. 2010) (describing
peremptory or jus cogens rules).
179. EDWARD M. WISE, ELLEN S. PODGOR & ROGER S. CLARK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 58–60 (3d ed. 2009).
180. Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, International Law in Domestic Courts: A Conflict
of Laws Approach, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 269, 271 (2010).
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it “by characterizing it . . . as domestic law.”181 Scholars observe that
Conflict of Laws brings a “wealth of experience” to inform debates
about the role of international law in domestic courts.182 Calling the
technical nature of Conflict of Laws doctrine “a strength” and not a
“shortcoming,” these thinkers maintain that Conflicts provides a
structured technique for “thinking through problems of legal,
political and cultural relativism.”183
We see then that although both international law and Conflict of
Laws have much in common, the two fields don’t “talk” to each other
enough. Here lies an opportunity for Conflict of Laws scholars and
regulators: to initiate dialogue with international law thinkers as well
as possible joint ventures.
C. Uncharted Territory: Sovereignty or Other Ways of
Conceptualizing Governance and Identity
Finally, I propose that Conflicts thinkers travel into relatively new,
uncharted territory. Specifically, I see the discipline as capable of
expanding beyond concepts of governmental sovereignty, so as to
conceptualize alternative, potentially more effective units, through
which humans might relate to each other. Are sovereign nations or
states the best way to conduct group interactions? When we think of
rights, disputes about rights, and modes to ensure preservation of
rights, should we focus solely on governmentally constituted courts
and potentially clashing legislative principles? Or should we
conceive some different kind of unit for group interaction and rights
protection? Is Conflict of Laws learning useful only for umpiring
clashes of one sovereign government against another? Might it also
be useful for negotiating clashes among non-state actors?
181. Id. at 270.
182. Id. at 271.
183. Id. Other scholars are not so sanguine about how useful currently constituted conflict of law
doctrine can be in world governance. For example, Professor Horatia Muir Watt argues the choice of
law, personal jurisdiction, and judgment recognition doctrines within international criminal law need to
be reconstituted to avoid manipulation by private actors and to provide meaningful global governance.
Horatia Muir Watt, Reshaping Private International Law in a Changing World, CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET
(April 2, 2008), http://conflictoflaws.net/2008/guest-editorial-muir-watt-on-reshaping-privateinternational-law-in-a-changing-world/.
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Governments are proving increasingly inept at erecting electronic
borders.184 This suggests that humans are in the process of
developing communities—through social media or otherwise—that
have become so expansive and powerful that they are evolving into
autonomous entities, entities that might take on a role of “legitimate”
norm definition. What is the role of Conflicts in this evolution?
Conflict of Laws confines its role simply to negotiating new clashes
among “legitimate” norms? Conflicts thinkers develop deep
experience with identifying modes and purposes of regulation—as
well as with evaluating and protecting procedural systems. Perhaps
they might deploy this expertise in guiding these communities as they
form and develop.
A catalyst for encouraging new non-state communities (and
enhancing their status) may come from changes in the concept of
national citizenship. On this topic, a rich literature has developed that
challenges traditional concepts of citizenship, asking whether
citizenship is no longer relevant in today’s world.185 Regardless of
whether citizenship will soon disappear as a defining concept of
world governance, contemporary conceptions of citizenship have
evolved, and now include diverse elements such as “status, rights,
political engagement, and identity.”186 What will be the role of this
broad concept as transnational communities become more robust?
Consider contemporary clashes over citizenship, which test both
the definition of citizenship itself as well as a population’s tolerance
for diversity. A particularly salient example pertains to laws
restricting burqa and niqab wearing on French territory: French
authorities have suggested that burqa or niqab wearing may reflect a
woman’s rejection of core French values, justifying the government
to refuse the woman citizenship status.187 This position coincides
184. See, e.g., Little, supra note 164, at 3 (explaining that “despite the internet’s increasing
integration into modern life, the debate about internet governance has not resolved”).
185. See, e.g., LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP (Princeton University Press 2008); PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN
IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (Oxford University Press 2008); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal
Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243 (2009); Berman, supra note 164.
186. BOSNIAK, supra note 185, at 20.
187. Siobhán Mullally, Civic Integration, Migrant Women and the Veil: At the Limits of Rights?, 74
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with national policy agendas implementing “integration testing”
seeking to erect barriers to citizenship for immigrants.188 Might not
the policy and systemic sensitivities that permeate choice of law
doctrines help to navigate clashes of this type?
As a discipline, Conflict of Laws relies heavily on the concept of
domicile. For example, domicile triggers First Restatement vested
rights and strong government interests under Governmental Interest
analysis.189 Domicile is also prominently listed as an important
connecting factor in myriad Second Restatement sections,190 and is a
well-litigated status.191 Conflict of Laws has an extensive record for
handling attempts to manipulate domicile as well as policy clashes on
the topic.192 As such, the discipline possesses expansive learning to
contribute to debates about the role of domicile, residency, and
citizenship in contemporary life.193 This could prove enormously
useful as the world adapts to new forms of group interactions and
inevitable clashes that occur.
CONCLUSION
The genesis of Conflict of Laws is debated, with some scholars
finding its origins in Ancient Greece and others placing its roots in
the Middle Ages.194 However one comes down on this debate, no
MOD. L. REV. 27, 28–29 (2011).
188. Id. at 28–29.
189. Whytock, supra note 123, at 494.
190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (listing domicile as a connecting
factor for choice of law decisions in general tort cases); Id. at § 150 (listing domicile as a presumptive
connecting factor for choice of law decisions in multistate defamation cases); Id. at § 188 (listing
domicile as a connecting factor for choice of law decisions in general contract cases).
191. For a particularly thoughtful, well-researched decision on domicile, see Mzamane v. Winfrey,
693 F. Supp. 2d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2010). The Mzamane case concerns a case of alleged multi-jurisdictional
defamation, one of many instances where the law of the plaintiff’s domicile is often outcome
determinative. Id.
192. See In re Dorrance’s Estate, 163 A. 303 (Pa. 1932) (holding John Dorrance died domiciled in
Pennsylvania); In re Dorrance’s Estate, 170 A. 601 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff’d mem., Dorrance v.
Thayer Martin, 176 A. 902 (N.J. 1935) (holding John Dorrance died domiciled in New Jersey). These
cases provide a lesson against gaming the concept of citizenship and domicile.
193. Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 442. The Mzamane case depicts how classic domicile principles can
negotiate the transnational realities of modern life. Id.
194. See generally SCOLES, supra note 166 (outlining historical debate).
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doubt exists that the discipline has survived, developed, and served
civilization for a long time. Its doctrines are sometimes technical and
highly abstract. With the recent cascades of changes in technology,
society, legal doctrine, theory, and law practice, a historically rooted,
technical discipline may seem out of step with the challenges of
modern life. Yet mechanisms for navigating differences among
societies and legal systems are the essence of modern life. What
Conflicts brings to these challenges is not only experience and age,
but also a forthright recognition that law is imbued with cultural and
political realities. Conflicts of Laws doctrines add discipline,
structure, and respect to some of the most challenging legal issues of
our time. With its wisdom and experience, Conflict of Laws is poised
to provide guidance—and has the potential to lead the way in reconceptualizing (and resolving) contemporary power clashes. The
feedback Conflict of Laws offers up may not always be clear; nor
will it be necessarily perfect. But it will be disciplined, structured,
and supported by time-tested reasoning. There’s not much more that
one can expect from mere mortals’ law.
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